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OUTLIVING CIVIL RIGHTS 
NINA A. KOHN∗  
ABSTRACT 
All fifty states have adopted statutes designed to protect older adults 
from abuse and neglect. While those statutes have been critiqued on 
functional and moral grounds, their legal implications have largely been 
ignored. In this Article, I fill that conspicuous gap and, in the process, 
show how elder protection systems significantly burden the constitutional 
rights of older adults—including the right to informational privacy, the 
right to engage in consensual sexual relations, and the right to enjoy equal 
protection of the law. I demonstrate that a subset of these burdens may be 
so unreasonable that the statutes are not only unwise, but also 
unconstitutional. I then explore how recognizing the burdens that current 
elder protection systems impose on older adults’ civil rights could lead to 
a fundamental shift in the design of elder protection legislation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The past two decades have witnessed a surge of interest in protecting 
senior citizens from victimization. As social service providers and 
policymakers have become increasingly aware of and sensitized to the 
problems of elder abuse and neglect—problems estimated to affect three to 
five percent of seniors annually in the United States1—they have 
 
 
 1. See James E. Lett, Abuse of the Elderly, 82 J. FLA. MED. ASS’N. 678 (1995) (explaining the 
origin of the commonly used 3–5% figure); ELDER MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND 
EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA 18–25 (Richard J. Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter “ELDER MISTREATMENT”] (discussing the existing state of research on elder abuse 
prevalence, and discussing a series of studies suggesting a 3–5% prevalence rate); see also NATIONAL 
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responded by advocating for new laws to protect senior citizens from 
mistreatment. States have, in turn, enacted a variety of new statutes aimed 
at protecting older adults. Although well-intentioned, many of these 
statutes take a paternalistic approach that has serious—and potentially 
unjustifiable—civil rights implications for the seniors they are designed to 
protect. For example, some limit older adults’ substantive due process 
rights by criminalizing certain forms of consensual sexual behavior; others 
undermine older adults’ informational privacy rights by requiring the 
doctors, attorneys, priests, or other confidants to report suspected abuse or 
neglect to the state. The effect is that, in some states, a person’s 
constitutional rights will be curtailed simply because he or she attains the 
age of sixty or sixty-five. 
Although paternalistic elder protection statutes have repeatedly been 
critiqued, the burdens that they impose on legal rights have largely been 
ignored and consequently their legal permissibility has gone unchallenged. 
In this Article, I fill that conspicuous gap by providing a constitutionally 
based critique of several important categories of elder protection statutes. 
In so doing, I demonstrate the real, tangible, and largely overlooked rights 
implications of current legislative approaches addressing elder 
mistreatment, and show that a subset of the statutes designed to address 
elder mistreatment may be unconstitutional.  
My primary aim, however, is not to show why courts might reasonably 
find certain elder protection statutes to be unconstitutional, although this is 
one of the Article’s key contributions. Rather, it is to show that identifying 
the burdens such statutes impose on older adults’ constitutional rights,2 
and labeling them as such, has the potential to fundamentally change 
legislative approaches to elder mistreatment. The United States is a 
country founded on liberal ideals where the political discourse is 
dominated by competing notions of liberalism. Consistent with this 
tradition, in the legislative realm and in the court of popular opinion, 
“rights” can function as trump cards in a way that mere “values” cannot.3 
 
 
CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE, ELDER ABUSE PREVALENCE AND INCIDENCE (2005), available at 
http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/ncearoot/Main_Site/pdf/publication/FinalStatistics050331.pdf (providing 
information about conflicting prevalence estimates). The actual prevalence of elder mistreatment 
remains unknown, although a number of studies have attempted to provide rough estimates. The 
federal government is currently funding a series of research initiatives aimed at determining the best 
way to measure the prevalence of elder mistreatment. The delay in generating a meaningful national 
study of prevalence, however, remains a source of great frustration for researchers and advocates. 
 2. In this Article, “constitutional rights” refers to those rights for which the United States 
Constitution provides, or arguably provides, protection.  
 3. See discussion infra notes 224–35 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, even where arguments about the constitutional implications of an 
elder protection statute might not lead courts to declare it unconstitutional, 
a recognition of such implications may have sufficient rhetorical and 
persuasive power to cause policymakers to reject it as undesirable or 
politically impractical.  
With these goals in mind, the Article proceeds with five major Parts. 
Part II provides an overview of the current legal framework addressing the 
problem of elder mistreatment. Parts III and IV analyze two distinct types 
of laws designed to protect elders, revealing the serious—and potentially 
unconstitutional—implications they can have for older adults’ 
constitutional rights. Part V calls for recognizing and labeling these 
implications of current elder protection laws as burdens on constitutional 
rights and explores how doing so could fundamentally shift the focus of 
elder protection legislation. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ELDER PROTECTION SYSTEM 
Elder mistreatment is a phenomenon that includes physical, 
psychological, and sexual abuse, as well as financial exploitation of older 
adults. The term is also frequently used to describe self-neglect, a 
phenomenon in which individuals fail to meet their own health, safety, or 
personal hygiene needs. Elder mistreatment is not only a source of injury 
and of great emotional and physical pain, but is also associated with 
significantly enhanced mortality rates.4 
Although the problem of elder mistreatment is not new, governmental 
authorities failed to recognize it until the middle of the twentieth century. 
The issue first received meaningful attention in the context of concerns 
about mistreatment of vulnerable adults in general. In 1953, the American 
Public Welfare Association (APWA) formally identified a need for 
protective services for physically or mentally challenged adults.5 In the 
two decades that followed, through the efforts of the APWA and 
advocates in the social work field, federal legislation was passed to fund 
demonstration projects to provide services to physically and mentally 
challenged adults.6 These efforts paved the way for Congress’ passage in 
1974 of Title XX of the Social Security Act,7 which effectively required 
 
 
 4. Rosalie S. Wolf, Introduction: The Nature and Scope of Elder Abuse, 24 GENERATIONS 6 
(2000). 
 5. Nina A. Kohn, Second Childhood: What Child Protection Systems Can Teach Elder 
Protection Systems, 14 STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 182–83 (2003). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Rosalie Wolf, Appendix C: Elder Abuse & Neglect: History and Concepts, in ELDER 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/1
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all states to create adult protective service (APS) units.8 These units 
originally focused on self-care and dementia issues, but have evolved so 
that today they place elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation front and center 
in their work.9 
Interest in elder abuse temporarily waned following the passage of 
Title XX, but reemerged after a series of hearings on the topic in the late 
1970s sparked congressional interest in the issue.10 This resurgence of 
interest in elder abuse was marked by a change in how elder abuse was 
perceived. Instead of previous conceptions of elder abuse as an issue of 
vulnerability, elder abuse was now treated as an issue of age.11 Terms such 
as “granny bashing”12 and “elder abuse” entered the political lexicon.  
Characterizing the abuse of elders as an “age” issue encouraged 
policymakers to look to another, already existing, age-based protection 
regime in designing a response. Policies aimed at protecting children from 
abuse and neglect became the frame of reference and so the adult 
protective system came to be in large part modeled on child protective 
systems.13 This frame of reference has had a profound effect on the design 
of elder protection laws. In some cases, laws designed to protect children 
were adopted in the elder mistreatment context with little more tailoring 
than substituting the word “elder” for “child.” For example, the concept of 
mandatory reporting, discussed at length in Part III, was borrowed from 
mandatory child abuse reporting schemes largely without consideration of 
whether it was appropriate for the senior population.14 As discussed in 
 
 
MISTREATMENT, supra note 1, at 239 [hereinafter “Wolf, Appendix C”]. 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (2000). This is somewhat ironic, however, given that evidence from the 
demonstration projects suggested that the resulting services were “very costly and of questionable 
effect.” See Wolf, Appendix C, supra note 7, at 239. 
 9. Kohn, supra note 5, at 183.  
 10. See Wolf, Appendix C, supra note 7, at 239. 
 11. See id. at 240; cf. ELDER MISTREATMENT, supra note 1, at 15 (“It appears that elder 
mistreatment became identified as a national concern when it was conceptualized as an ‘aging’ issue, 
rather than as an unidentified component of adult protection.”). 
 12. Bridget Penhale & Paul Kinston, Elder Abuse: An Overview of Recent and Current 
Developments, 3 HEALTH & SOCIAL CARE IN THE COMMUNITY 311 (2007) (explaining that the term 
“granny bashing” first originated in a 1975 article published in Britain but soon filtered into American 
politics).  
 13. Components of the elder protection system that have been modeled on the child protection 
system are numerous and diverse. They range from the creation of APS, which was modeled on child 
protective services (see ROSALIE S. WOLF & KARL A. PILLEMER, HELPING ELDERLY VICTIMS: THE 
REALITY OF ELDER ABUSE 149–50 (1989)) and mandatory reporting schemes, to more recent 
developments such as state elder abuse registries modeled on child abuse registries (see Elder 
Mistreatment, supra note 1, at 125) and elder abuse fatality review teams modeled on child abuse 
fatality review teams (see BONNIE BRANDL ET AL., ELDER ABUSE DETECTION AND INTERVENTION: A 
COLLABORATIVE APPROACH 15 (2007)).  
 14. See Wolf, Appendix C, supra note 7, at 123. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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more detail later in this Article, the result has been a heavily paternalistic 
elder protection system.15 
Although the first wave of interest in elder mistreatment was 
characterized by federal legislative leadership, legislative action following 
the reemergence of the issue in the late 1970s occurred, and continues to 
occur, primarily at the state level. All fifty states have enacted at least 
some form of legislation to address elder mistreatment.16 This legislative 
activity has been facilitated by a vocal, passionate network of aging-
focused service providers and advocates, armed with reports of abused 
elders—fathers starved to death, mothers raped by drug-abusing sons, 
nursing home residents rotting with bedsores, older men seduced by 
professional “girlfriends”17—that shock the conscience and have evoked 
bipartisan outrage, sympathy, and desire to take action.18 
Today, despite continued agitation for comprehensive federal 
legislation to address elder mistreatment, the legal framework for elder 
protection exists predominantly at the state level. Although there is 
considerable variation among the states, the vast majority of laws aimed at 
protecting older adults fall into one of three categories. First, there are 
laws that create and govern state APS units, which are charged with 
providing services to vulnerable adults. APS agencies are generally 
viewed as the front-line responders to the problem of elder mistreatment 
because they both investigate reports of elder mistreatment and offer 
victim services.19 In general, APS may only provide services with the 
consent of the alleged victim. Under certain circumstances, however, APS 
may be authorized to provide victim services without the alleged victim’s 
consent and notwithstanding the alleged victim’s explicit objection.20 
Second, there are elder abuse reporting laws that permit or require certain 
persons to report certain types of mistreatment to a government agency, 
 
 
 15. See infra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Lori A. Stiegel, What Can Courts Do About Elder Abuse?, 35 JUDGES J. 38, 38 (1996). 
 17. The National Center for Elder Abuse provides a listserv with a daily feed of such stories. 
This resource provides ample anecdotal evidence for those aging service providers and advocates 
seeking illustrations of the tragic impact of elder mistreatment.  
 18. Cf. Marshall B. Kapp, Book Review, 5 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 121 (2003) (arguing that 
elder abuse has been an area where Congress has reacted first and the legal community has questioned 
later). 
 19. See PAMELA B. TEASTER, A RESPONSE TO ABUSE OF VULNERABLE ADULTS: THE 2000 
SURVEY OF STATE ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES 5, 11 (2003), available at http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/ 
NCEAroot/Main_Site/ pdf/research/apsreport030703.pdf. 
 20. See Lisa Nerenberg, Communities Respond to Elder Abuse, in ELDER ABUSE & 
MISTREATMENT: POLICY, PRACTICE & RESEARCH 11–12 (M. Joanna Mellor & Patricia Brownell eds., 
2006) (discussing exceptions to the general rule that APS services are voluntary in nature). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/1
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typically APS.21 A third category of elder protection laws consists of 
statutes that specifically prohibit or specially penalize (or both) certain 
treatment of older adults. Some create new crimes for which perpetrators 
of elder mistreatment can be held liable; others provide for enhanced 
penalties for those convicted of crimes involving elderly or otherwise 
vulnerable victims. Together, these three types of laws create the core of 
what this Article will refer to as the “elder protection system.” 
The development of these broad, state-level elder protection systems is 
cause for some celebration. These systems represent recognition by states 
that elder mistreatment is a problem deserving public attention and a 
commitment by states to take measures to try to meet the needs of older 
adults. At the same time, however, such elder protection systems are not 
without flaws. A number of these flaws have been the subject of prior 
criticism.22 One flaw that has been largely overlooked, however, is that 
this system significantly burdens the legal rights of older adults. The next 
two Parts of this Article explore how two key components of elder 
protection systems—mandatory reporting laws and laws designed to 
protect older adults from sexual abuse—limit the civil rights of the persons 
they aim to protect.23 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & MANDATORY REPORTING 
The design of, and discussion about, mandatory elder abuse reporting 
statutes provides perhaps the best example of how the elder protection 
system has overlooked the civil rights implications of its interventions. 
This next Part discusses the design of mandatory reporting statutes, 
reviews existing critiques of those statutes, and reveals the burden that 
they can impose on older adults’ constitutionally protected rights.  
A. Overview of Mandatory Reporting Laws 
In every state, elder abuse that occurs at certain residential facilities, 
including nursing homes, must be reported to the state.24 The vast majority 
 
 
 21. Efforts to require reporting at the federal level, by comparison, have been unsuccessful.  
 22. For example, mandatory reporting laws have received extensive criticism. See discussion 
infra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
 23. Thus, the Article examines statutes in two of the three categories of elder protection laws. 
This does not mean that statutes in the third category—those governing APS—do not also have civil 
rights implications. Rather, the decision to focus on statutes in only the later two categories reflects a 
recognition that there is currently significant legislative interest in adopting and amending statutes in 
these categories, and therefore there is particular value in identifying their civil rights implications. 
 24. Federal law requires abuse that occurs in nursing homes be reported to the appropriate state 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of states currently also require at least some categories of persons to report 
elder mistreatment regardless of residential setting.25 Statutes mandating 
reporting of abuse or neglect of non-institutionalized elders, hereafter 
referred to as “mandatory elder abuse reporting statutes” (as they are 
commonly called), vary in four primary ways.  
First, they vary in the categories of persons upon whom they impose a 
duty to report. While some states require all persons with reason to suspect 
mistreatment to report,26 others limit the duty to report to certain 
categories of persons.27 Health care professionals are the most frequently 
targeted reporters, but some states also single out bank employees, social 
workers, coroners, law enforcement personnel, and assorted other public 
officials for special reporting duties.28 To ensure that there is no confusion, 
 
 
agency. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.13(c)(2) (2009). 
 25. Only five states lack mandatory reporting requirements. See LORI STIEGEL & ELLEN KLEM, 
REPORTS AND REFERRALS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: PROVISIONS AND CITATIONS IN ADULT 
PROTECTIVE SERVICES LAWS, BY STATE (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/aging/about/pdfs/ 
APS_Reports_and_Referrals_to_Law_Enforcement_Provisions_Chart.pdf. Among those states that do 
not mandate reporting, voluntary reporting is nevertheless encouraged. In some states, this 
encouragement is written into the statutory code. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-3.1-102(1)-(3) 
(West Supp. 2008) (specifically encouraging certain categories of persons to report abuse); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 52:27D–409(a) (West 2001) (specifically stating that any person may report abuse, neglect, or 
exploitation of a vulnerable adult); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.2-03 (2007) (specifically inviting reports 
of abuse and neglect).  
 26. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3910(a) (Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1034 (West 
Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-9(a) (West 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.030(2)-(6)(a) 
(LexisNexis 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(C), (D)(1)-(4), (E)(6) (Supp. 2009); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 660.255(1) (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-F:46 (Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. § 27-7-
30(A)–(B) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-102(a) to (b) (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-
104(A) (West Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-8 (Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-
103(b)(1) (2004); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.051 (Vernon Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 62A-3-305(1) (West Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-103(a) (2007). 
 27. See ALA. CODE § 38-9-8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010 (2006); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(A)–(C) (Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1708(a)–(c) (2007); CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630(a)–(f) (West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-451(a) (West 
2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-4(a)(1) & (b) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-224(a)–(b) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5303(1) (2002); 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/2(f-
5) (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235B.3 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1431(a)–(b) (2007); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3477(1)–(4) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 14-302(a) & (d) 
(LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, § 15(a)–(b), 15(e) (West 2008); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 400.11a (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5572 (West Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 43-47-7(1) (Supp. 2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 660.255(1) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-3-
811(3) (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-372(1) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.5093(4) (West 
Supp. 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.61(A) (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 430.735(9), 
430.743 (West Supp. 2008); PA. STAT. ANN., § 10225.701 (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-25 
(2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6903(a) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1606(A) (Supp. 2008); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.34.020(10) (West Supp. 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6-9(a) 
(LexisNexis 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.90(4) (West Supp. 2008). 
 28. Cf., Stiegel & Klem, supra note 25; see also Teaster, supra note 19, at 20. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/1
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a number of states explicitly state that these reporting duties abrogate the 
privilege of confidentiality that might otherwise exist.29 
Second, states vary in the consequences they impose on those who fail 
to fulfill their duty to report. In most states, such failure is a 
misdemeanor.30 In some of these, the penalty for the misdemeanor of 
failure to report is exclusively a monetary fine.31 In other states, jail time 
may be imposed.32 A few states also allow it to be the basis for imposition 
 
 
 29. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 161-F:48 (West 2002) (“The privileged quality of 
communication between husband and wife and any professional person and his patient or client, except 
that between attorney and client, shall not apply to any proceedings instituted pursuant to this 
subdivision and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as required by this subdivision.”). 
 30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-10 (LexisNexis 1992); ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010(c) (2006); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(K) (Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1720(a) (2007); CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630(h) (West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-451(a) (West 
2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-8(b)(2) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-224(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5303(2) (2002); 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/4(e) (West 2008); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 235B.3(12) (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1431(e) (Supp. 2007); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(A) (Supp. 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7(1)(c) (Supp. 2008); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 28-384 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.5093(9) (West Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 161-F:50 (2002); N.M. STAT. § 27-7-30(C) (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-104(D) 
(West Supp. 2008); PA. STAT. ANN., § 10225.706(c) (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-85(A) 
(2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-110 (2004); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.052(a) (Vernon 
2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-3-305(4) (Supp. 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 74.34.053(1) (West 
2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6-14 (LexisNexis 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-111(b) (2007). 
 31. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, § 15(a) (West Supp. 2008) (fining any required 
person who fails to make a report not more than one thousand dollars); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-47-
7(1)(c) (Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-8 (Supp. 2006) (fining any person who fails to make a 
report not more than one thousand dollars); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6913(b) (2008); (fining a 
mandatory reporter who willfully fails to make such a report no more than $500 for each 24-hour 
period that a report was not made with a maximum penalty of $5,000 per reportable incident); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1606(H) (Supp. 2008) (fining any person who fails to make a required report “$500 
for the first failure and not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 for any subsequent failures”). 
 32. Some limit imprisonment to as little as ten or thirty days. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-
224(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008), HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 701-107 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) 
(punishment consisting of imprisonment not exceeding thirty days); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235B.3(12) 
(West Supp. 2008), IOWA CODE ANN. § 903.1(1)(a) (West 2008) (punishment consisting of a “fine of 
at least sixty-five dollars but not to exceed six hundred twenty-five dollars” and “[t]he court may order 
imprisonment not to exceed thirty days in lieu of a fine or in addition to a fine”); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 9-6-14 (LexisNexis 2007) (punishment consisting of a fine “not more than one hundred dollars or 
imprison[ment] for not more than ten days, or both”). A number limit imprisonment to 90 days or three 
months. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010(c) (2007), ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135(b) (2006), ALASKA 
STAT. § 12.55.035(b)(6) (Supp. 2009) (punishment consisting of “definite term of imprisonment of not 
more than 90 days” and/or a fine of no more than $2,000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1720(a) (West 
2008), ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(b)(2) (2007), ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-201(b)(2) (West 2008) 
(punishment consisting of a sentence not exceeding ninety days and/or a fine not exceeding five 
hundred dollars); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-384, 28-106 (1995) (punishment consisting of imprisonment 
not exceeding three months and/or a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
74.34.053(1) (West 2001), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9A.20.010(2) (West 2000) (punishment consisting 
of a fine not more than one thousand dollars or imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both). 
 A limit of six months imprisonment is also common. See ALA. CODE § 38-9-10 (LexisNexis 1992) 
(punishment for physicians or others engaged in healing arts consisting of “imprisonment for not more 
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of civil liability.33 Finally, failure to report may have licensure 
implications for certain professionals.34  
 
 
than six months or a fine of not more than $500.00”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(K) (Supp. 
2008), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-707(A)(1) (Supp. 2008), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-802(A) 
(2001) (punishment consisting of imprisonment of no more than six months and/or a fine not more 
than two thousand five hundred dollars); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630(h) (West Supp. 2008) 
(punishment consisting of imprisonment for not more than six months, or a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars, or both); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-113(1) (Supp. 2008) (punishment consisting of 
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or both); 320 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/4(e) (West 2008), 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-3(a)(1) (West 2007), 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1431(e) (Supp. 2007), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4502(1)(b) (2007), KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-4503(c)(2) (2007) (punishment consisting of a definite term of confinement not to exceed 
six months and a fine in addition to or instead of the confinement not exceeding $1,000); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(A) (Supp. 2009) (punishment consisting of a fine not more than five hundred 
dollars, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7(1)(c) 
(Supp. 2008) (punishment consisting of a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment 
for not more than six months, or both); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.5093(9) (West Supp. 2008), NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.150(1) (West Supp. 2008) (punishment consisting of imprisonment for not 
more than 6 months, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-3-305(4) 
(Supp. 2008), UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-204(2) (2003), UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-301(d) (2003) 
(punishment consisting of imprisonment not exceeding six months and/or a fine not exceeding 
$1,000). 
 Most frequently, however, states allow for terms of imprisonment of a year or nearly a year. See 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-451(a) (West 2006), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-36 (West 2007), 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-42 (West 2007) (punishment consisting of a fine of not more than five 
hundred dollars for failing to report but if such failure is intentional, punishment shall be imprisonment 
not to exceed three months and/or a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars for the first offense and 
punishment shall be imprisonment not to exceed one year and/or a fine not to exceed two thousand 
dollars for any subsequent offense); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-8(b)(2) (2007), GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-
3(a)(1) (Supp. 2007) (punishment consisting of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months, or a fine not 
to exceed $1,000.00, or both); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5303(2) (2002), 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/5-9-1(a)(2) (West 2007) (punishment consisting of imprisonment less than one year, or a fine not 
exceeding $2,500, or both); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-F:50 (2002), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 651:2(II), (IV) (2007) (punishment consisting of imprisonment not to exceed one year and a fine 
not exceeding $2,000); N.M. STAT. § 27-7-30(C) (2007), N.M. STAT. § 31-19-1(A) (2007) 
(punishment consisting of imprisonment for less than one year, or a fine not more than one thousand 
dollars, or both); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-104(D) (West Supp. 2008) (punishment consisting 
of imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or both); PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 10225.706(c) (West 2003), PA. STAT. ANN. § 1104(3) (West 1998), PA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1101(6) (West 1998) (punishment consisting of imprisonment of not more than one year, or a fine 
not exceeding $2,500, or both); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-85(A) (2008) (punishment consisting of a 
fine not more than twenty-five hundred dollars or imprisonment of not more than one year); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 71-6-110 (2004), TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-111 (2006) (punishment consisting of 
imprisonment “not greater than eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days or a fine not to exceed two 
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or both”); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.052(a) (Vernon 
2001), TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.21 (Vernon 2003) (punishment consisting of a fine not to exceed 
$4,000, or confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year, or both); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-
111(b) (2008) (punishment consisting of imprisonment for not more than one year, or a fine not more 
than one thousand dollars, or both). 
 33. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1720(b) (West 2008) (making any mandated reporter or 
caregiver who purposely fails to make a report civilly liable for damages proximately caused by such 
failure); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235B.3(12) (West 2008) (making a mandated reporter who fails to make a 
report civilly liable for the damages proximately caused by such failure); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
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Third, states vary as to the factors triggering the duty to report. In some 
jurisdictions, reporting requirements apply to all apparent victims who 
have attained the statutorily specified triggering age, regardless of their 
mental or physical limitations or other vulnerabilities. For example, Rhode 
Island requires “all persons with reasonable cause to believe that a person 
age 60 or older has been subject to abuse, neglect, exploitation, or is self-
neglecting” to report it to the State.35 Similarly, under Texas law any 
person having reason to believe that a person age sixty-five or older is 
being abused, neglected, or exploited must notify the designated state 
agency.36 The Texas statute explicitly states that this duty extends to 
persons whose “professional communications are generally confidential, 
including an attorney, clergy member, medical practitioner, social worker, 
and mental health professional.”37 In other states, age is one of two or 
more variables triggering a duty to report.38 In yet other states, although 
age is not itself a factor, “infirmities” or “impairments” associated with 
age can trigger reporting duties.39 Finally, some states avoid making age 
 
 
§ 400.11e(1) (West 2008) (making a required person who fails to make a report liable civilly for the 
damages proximately caused by the failure to report). 
 34. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010(c) (2006) (“If a person convicted under this section is a 
member of a profession or occupation that is licensed, certified, or regulated by the state, the court 
shall notify the appropriate licensing, certifying, or regulating entity of the conviction.”); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 39-5303(2)(a) (2002) (allowing a facility’s license to be revoked if an employee at a state 
licensed or certified residential facility fails to report abuse or sexual assault that has resulted in death 
or serious physical injury jeopardizing the life, health, or safety of a vulnerable adult); 320 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 20/4(e) (West 2008), 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/22(A) (West Supp. 2008), 225 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 25/23 (West 2007) (allowing the license of a physician, dentist, or dental hygienist 
to be revoked for willful failure to make a report); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7(1)(c) (Supp. 2008) 
(requiring a court to notify the appropriate licensing, certifying, or regulating entity of a conviction if 
the person convicted is “a member of a profession or occupation that is licensed, certified or regulated 
by the state”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-85(A) (2008) (subjecting any person required to report who 
knowingly and willfully fails to report to “disciplinary action as may be determined necessary by the 
appropriate licensing board”). 
 35. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-8 (Supp. 2008). Prior to 2007, Rhode Island did not include self-
neglecting elders in its mandatory reporting statute. Instead, the state required mandatory reporting of 
“abandoned elders.” The 2007 amendments replaced the word “abandoned” with “self-neglecting,” 
and added a provision stating that “[n]othing in this section shall require an elder who is a victim . . . 
or who is self-neglecting to make a report . . . .” See 2007 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 209, § 1 (eff. July 2, 
2007). 
 36. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 48.051, 48.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008). 
 37. Id. § 48.051(c). 
 38. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 660.255, 660.250 (2000) (defining the category of persons 
about whom reports must be made to include any “person sixty years of age or older . . . who is unable 
to protect his own interests or adequately perform or obtain services which are necessary to meet his 
essential human needs”). 
 39. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.102(26) (West Supp. 2008) (defining a “vulnerable adult,” 
the category of persons about whom reports are mandated, as including any adult “whose ability to 
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either directly or indirectly a factor that triggers a duty to report; rather, 
such states tend to have reporting requirements triggered by the alleged 
victim’s “vulnerability” in general.40 
Fourth, states differ in their definitions of reportable elder abuse and 
neglect. A major distinction is whether states include “self-neglect” (i.e., 
neglect that occurs when an individual fails to meet his or her own basic 
needs). In states that include self-neglect, cases involving self-neglect 
account for a significant portion of reported instances of mistreatment.41 
Although the inclusion of self-neglect in mandatory reporting schemes has 
been criticized as a form of “social control” unduly limiting individuals’ 
self determination,42 a current legislative trend is to enlarge the scope of 
existing mandatory reporting laws to require reporting of self-neglect.43 
Finally, some states provide exceptions to general reporting 
requirements. For example, unless the apparent victim’s life or health is 
“immediately threatened,” Maine does not require professionals to report 
mistreatment if their factual basis for knowing or suspecting the 
mistreatment was obtained while treating the suspected perpetrator for a 
related problem.44 Similarly, Maine does not require professionals to 
report if their factual basis for suspecting mistreatment was obtained in the 
course of treating the apparent victim for a problem relating to 
mistreatment unless the victim is “incapacitated” or her health is 
“immediately threatened.”45 In Wisconsin, unless a person other than the 
alleged victim is currently at risk, reporting is only required where there is 
“imminent risk of serious bodily harm, death, sexual assault, or significant 
property loss” to the alleged victim and she “is unable to make an 
informed judgment about whether to report the risk.”46 Moreover, 
Wisconsin provides exceptions from mandatory reporting requirements 
where the otherwise mandated reporter has a documented belief that 
reporting would not be in the “best interest” of the victim or where the 
 
 
perform the normal activities of daily living or to provide for his or her own care or protection is 
impaired due to . . . the infirmities of aging”). 
 40. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.900(16) (2006) (defining “vulnerable adults,” the category 
of persons about whom reports are mandated, in strictly age-neutral terms). 
 41. See, e.g., Elizabeth Capezuti, Barabara L. Brush & William T. Lawson, Reporting Elder 
Mistreatment, J. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 24, 27 (1997); Dorothy Ann Gilbert, The Ethics of 
Mandatory Elder Abuse Reporting Statutes, 8 ADVANCES IN NURSING SCI. 51, 57 (1986). 
 42. See Gilbert, supra note 41, at 57. 
 43. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-8 (Supp. 2008) (amended in 2007 to include self-neglect as 
a reportable form of abuse); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 19A, § 14 (West Supp. 2008) (amended in 
2004 to include self-neglect as a reportable form of abuse). 
 44. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3479-A(3) (Supp. 2008). 
 45. See id. § 3479-A(4). 
 46. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.90(4) (West Supp. 2008).  
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would-be reporter provides health care using “spiritual means” and her 
religion requires confidential communications.47 
B. Existing Critiques of Mandatory Reporting  
Mandatory elder abuse reporting laws have been critiqued on 
functional grounds. Functional critiques have focused on concerns that 
such laws may be ineffective, or even counterproductive.48 There is 
concern, for example, that mandatory reporting laws fail to meaningfully 
increase the number of cases of elder abuse reported, but nonetheless 
discourage vulnerable elders or their caregivers from seeking needed 
medical attention or assistance.49 Mandatory reporting statutes also have 
been blamed for hindering the ability of service providers to meet the 
needs of elder abuse victims by increasing providers’ investigatory 
obligations.50  
In addition, mandatory reporting laws have been repeatedly critiqued 
on moral grounds. The primary thrust of the moral critique is that 
mandatory reporting laws undermine the autonomy of older adults. This is 
seen as morally problematic because it undermines adults’ human dignity 
in ways that can be significant and unjustified, especially where 
 
 
 47. See id. 
 48. See, e.g., Capezuti, Brush & Lawson, supra note 41, at 26 (“Since there is no guarantee that 
reporting with result in successful APS intervention, nurses may actually place reporting elders in a 
more vulnerable position” if they comply with reporting duties); Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny 
from the Wolf: Elder Abuse and Neglect—The Legal Framework, 31 CONN. L. REV. 77, 107–09 (1998) 
(setting forth four arguments that have been advanced against mandatory elder abuse reporting: (1) 
that it undermines self-determination in an ageist manner, (2) that it violates confidential relationships, 
(3) that it is counter-productive because it will discourage victims from seeking help, and (4) that 
existing systems are ill-equipped to handle the resulting reports); Ruthann M. Macolini, Elder Abuse 
Policy: Considerations in Research and Legislation, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 349, 359 (1995) (discussing 
multiple critiques of mandatory reporting statutes and finding the functional line of critique 
persuasive); Molly Dickinson Velick, Mandatory Reporting Statutes: A Necessary Yet Underutilized 
Response to Elder Abuse, 3 ELDER L.J. 165 (1995) (arguing mandatory reporting laws can be more 
effective if (1) APS funding is increased, (2) mandatory reporting requirements are publicized, (3) 
interagency cooperation is increased, and (4) state statutes are amended to protect reporters); William 
A. Formby, Should Elder Abuse Be Decriminalized? A Justice System Perspective, 4 J. ELDER ABUSE 
& NEGLECT 121, 126 (1992) (arguing that mandatory reporting statutes are inappropriate given that 
mandated reporters have an “incomplete understanding” of elder abuse); Lawrence R. Faulkner, 
Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of Elder Abuse: An Inappropriate, Ineffective and Ageist 
Response to the Abuse of Older Adults, 16 FAM. L.Q. 69 (1982) (critiquing mandatory elder abuse 
reporting on a variety of functional grounds). 
 49. See, e.g., Moskowitz, supra note 48, at 109 (discussing the critique that mandatory reporting 
is counter-productive because it will discourage victims from seeking help). 
 50. See, e.g., ROSALIE S. WOLF & KARL A. PILLEMER, HELPING ELDERLY VICTIMS: THE 
REALITY OF ELDER ABUSE 149–50 (1989) [hereinafter “WOLF & PILLEMER, HELPING”]. 
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mandatory reporting laws apply to cognitively intact seniors.51 Many 
autonomy-focused critiques also express concern that mandatory elder 
abuse reporting statutes are ageist insofar as they selectively undermine 
the autonomy of older adults based on stereotypes about aging, or that they 
encourage ageism by promoting inappropriate stereotyping of older 
adults.52 In offering this moral critique, commentators frequently point to 
the potential conflict between mandatory reporting duties and pre-existing 
ethical norms. For example, numerous commentators have expressed 
concern that such laws require professionals to take actions that conflict 
with their ethical codes of conduct, even in contexts where client or patient 
autonomy is generally treated with great deference.53  
These existing critiques are largely well-founded but have done little to 
curb legislative enthusiasm for mandatory reporting laws. Rather, states 
continue to enact mandatory reporting statutes and continue to enlarge the 
scope of those laws already in existence.54 One reason such critiques may 
not have effectuated meaningful policy change is that they fail to fully 
recognize and describe the costs that mandatory reporting laws impose on 
seniors. Specifically, to the extent that critiques of mandatory reporting 
 
 
 51. See, e.g., Jennifer Beth Glick, Note, Protecting and Respecting Our Elders: Revising 
Mandatory Elder Abuse Reporting Statutes to Increase Efficacy and Preserve Autonomy, 12 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 714 (2005) (arguing that mandatory reporting laws are appropriate but, in the interest 
of “preserving autonomy,” should be revised to only require reporting where the would-be reporter has 
assessed the mental capacity of the subject of the report and found it lacking); Sandra Guerra 
Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: “Duty to Report” Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 19–24 (2002) (highlighting problems with mandatory reporting laws by 
discussing two elder abuse cases and arguing that such laws raise “concerns regarding the dignity and 
autonomy of competent elders”). 
 52. See, e.g., Mary Twomey, Mary Joy Quinn & Emily Dakin, From Behind Closed Doors: 
Shedding Light on Elder Abuse and Domestic Violence in Late Life, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, 
CHILD. & CTS. 73 (2005) (arguing that mandatory reporting inappropriately treats adults like children 
and arguing instead in favor of following a domestic abuse model); Stephen Crystal, Social Policy & 
Elder Abuse, in ELDER ABUSE: CONFLICT IN THE FAMILY 338–39 (Karl A. Pillemer & Rosalie S. Wolf 
eds., 1986) (arguing that mandatory reporting policies rest on inappropriate assumptions and 
stereotypes about older adults). 
 53. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 41, at 59 (arguing that mandatory reporting laws are “largely 
contrary to a contemporary ethical trend in nursing to weight autonomy heavily); Formby, supra note 
48, at 129 (“The criminalization of mandatory reporting places the physician, or other professional 
person, in the position of taking away the individual’s right to decide out of fear of prosecution.”); 
Capezuti, Brush & Lawson, supra note 41, at 29 (discussing the ethical conflict mandatory reporting 
statutes may pose for nurses). 
 54. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 19A, § 14 (West 2008) (amended in 2004 to include 
self-neglect as a reportable form of abuse); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-10 (2008) (amended in 2004 to 
expand the definition of exploitation to include causing a vulnerable adult to buy goods or services for 
the benefit of another using undue influence, harassment, duress, coercion, or swindling); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 63.2-1603 to 63.2-1606 (West 2008) (revised in 2004 to, among other things, expand the list of 
mandated reporters); CAL. CODE § 15610.07 (West 2008) (amended in 2001 to expand the definition 
of elder abuse). 
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laws express concern about limiting the ability of older adults to self-
determine, they tend to frame this concern in ideological or ethical terms.55 
This posture ignores the fact that undermining older adults’ abilities to 
determine their own fates can burden, and potentially violate, 
constitutionally protected rights. Although words such as “privacy” and 
“rights” are often used in these existing critiques, they are articulated in a 
generic manner, detached from any constitutionally informed meaning of 
such terms.56 As a result, as discussed in Part V, existing critiques neither 
fully appreciate nor fully describe the costs of mandatory reporting 
schemes and thus fail to capture an important and persuasive argument 
against mandatory reporting.  
C. A Rights-Based Critique of Mandatory Reporting 
Whereas viewing the autonomy-reducing impacts of mandatory 
reporting statutes simply as ethically, ideologically, or morally 
problematic provides an incomplete description of the cost of such 
statutes, simultaneously looking at such laws through a constitutional 
rights lens provides a more complete—and more troubling—picture. In the 
next Part, I look at mandatory reporting statutes through the lens of 
constitutional jurisprudence and thereby show how such laws can 
undermine constitutional liberty interests including those in informational 
privacy and equal protection of the law.  
1. Informational Privacy Rights 
Mandatory abuse reporting laws directly implicate the constitutional 
right to informational privacy. An individual has “informational privacy” 
 
 
 55. See, e.g., Christopher Dubble, A Policy Perspective on Elder Justice Through APS and Law 
Enforcement Collaboration, in ELDER ABUSE & MISTREATMENT: POLICY, PRACTICE & RESEARCH, 
supra note 20, at 44–46 (M. Joanna Mellor & Patricia Brownell eds., 2006) (discussing the 
“ideological debate” over victim self-determination). 
 56. This is true in the legal literature as well as the social science literature. See, e.g., Velick, 
supra note 48, at 172–73, 175 (arguing that concerns that mandatory reporting laws would amount to 
unnecessary invasions of privacy are (1) based on the mistaken assumption “that an elderly person 
who is mentally competent can report abuse or give permission for it to be reported”; and (2) blunted 
by procedures governing how such reports are to be handled by the state once they are made); Kristine 
S. Knaplund, The Right to Privacy & America’s Aging Population, 86 DENVER L. REV. 441 (2009) (in 
discussing elders’ ability to secure personal privacy in various care settings, focusing exclusively on 
statutory and regulatory protections and ignoring both constitutional protections and proposed policies’ 
implications for constitutionally recognized privacy interests); MARSHALL B. KAPP, LEGAL ASPECTS 
OF ELDER CARE 233–48 (2009) (in a chapter exclusively focused on “older individuals and the right to 
privacy,” only considering statutory and regulatory privacy rights). 
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when he or she can control the acquisition or dissemination of information 
about himself or herself. 57 Concurring in the 1977 case of Whalen v. 
Roe,58 Justice Brennan recognized the possibility that future cases might 
find a constitutionally based interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters.”59 Later that same year, in Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services,60 the Supreme Court assumed that President Nixon had a 
legitimate privacy interest in information about him that would be 
impacted by the screening of his papers for archival purposes.61  
The Supreme Court has failed to significantly develop and explain the 
right of informational privacy, and the right’s contours remain vague.62 
However, the majority of federal appellate courts have recognized such a 
right.63 Most commonly, federal courts have recognized individuals’ legal 
interest in informational privacy in the context of medical records and 
medical status. In the landmark case of Doe v. Barrington,64 for example, 
the New Jersey Federal District Court held that the plaintiff’s 
constitutional right of privacy was violated when a government agent 
revealed that the plaintiff was HIV-positive.65 Since that decision in 1990, 
a number of federal courts have come to broadly recognize a right to 
informational privacy vis-à-vis medical records.66  
 
 
 57. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 
1202–04 (1998) (grouping privacy rights into three categories: spatial privacy, decisional privacy, and 
informational privacy).  
 58. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 59. Id. at 606. In his concurrence in Whalen, Justice Brennan stated that the majority opinion 
“recognizes that an individual’s ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’ is an aspect of the 
right of privacy.” Id. at 607. The portions of the majority opinion cited by Brennan for this proposition, 
however, could simply be read as the Court recognizing that others have conceived of such a privacy 
right. See id. 599–600 & nn.24–25. 
 60. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 61. Id. at 456–57. 
 62. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATIONAL 
PRIVACY LAW 401 (2d ed. 2003).  
 63. Id. (noting that the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits have recognized 
a right to informational privacy; that the Sixth Circuit has recognized a limited right to informational 
privacy; but that the D.C. Circuit has questioned the existence of such a right). The Tenth Circuit has 
since joined in recognizing the right. See Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2006). 
For the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in refusing to recognize the right of information privacy, see J.P. v. 
DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 64. 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990). 
 65. See id.  
 66. See, e.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a transsexual prisoner 
had a constitutional privacy right protecting the confidentiality of the prisoner’s medical records); Doe 
v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a job applicant had a constitutional right 
to privacy regarding his HIV-positive status); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 2001) (treating the 
existence of a constitutional right to privacy over one’s own medical information as well settled and 
holding that the right extends to prisoners); Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 
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More importantly for the purposes of this Article, in recent years 
several courts have explicitly recognized that mandatory child abuse 
reporting laws infringe on the informational privacy rights of suspected 
victims. For example, in Aid for Women v. Foulston, professionals 
working with sexually active minors challenged the constitutionality of a 
Kansas child abuse reporting statute insofar as it mandated reporting of the 
consensual sexual activity of minors.67 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit found that minors possessed a right to informational privacy that 
was impacted by the state statute.68 Although the court ultimately declined 
to grant the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, this reflected 
the fact that the case involved children. The court explained that the 
privacy rights asserted were “diminished” because they were those of 
minors.69  
Later that year, in Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Carter,70 the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana considered the refusal of Planned Parenthood 
of Indiana (PPI) to turn over the medical records of minor patients as 
requested by the state, which was investigating PPI for neglecting its 
patients by failing to report child abuse.71 The court held that the minor 
patients had an informational privacy right in their records that could not 
be extinguished by the state choosing to criminalize certain conduct, in 
this case sexual contact with persons under the age of fourteen.72 The court 
further held that PPI had a reasonable likelihood of success in showing 
that requiring PPI to release the records to the state would constitute an 
unconstitutional violation of that right.73 
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California v. Van de 
Kamp,74 health care providers challenged the California Attorney 
General’s interpretation of a mandatory child abuse reporting statute that 
 
 
F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that employees of a research facility operated by state and federal 
agencies had a privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of medical information); Herring v. Keenan, 218 
F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a probationer alleged violation of a constitutional right when 
he alleged a probation officer violated his right to privacy by disclosing to probationer’s sister and 
employer that probationer was HIV-positive). 
 67. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101. 
 68. Id. at 1116. 
 69. Id. at 1120 (declining to grant the motion because the plaintiffs had failed to show (1) a 
significant likelihood that they could show the minors had a cognizable privacy interest in conduct that 
was concededly criminal, and (2) that the minors’ privacy rights would outweigh the government’s 
interest in reporting). 
 70. 854 N.E.2d 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 877. 
 73. Id. at 881. 
 74. 226 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1070 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:1053 
 
 
 
 
required reporting of any minor under the age of fourteen who presented 
any “indicia of past or present sexual activity.”75 The California Court of 
Appeals held that the Attorney General’s interpretation was 
impermissible.76 It then went on to assert in dictum that even if the 
legislature had written the statute as the Attorney General interpreted it, 
the statute would have violated minors’ rights to informational privacy 
under the California Constitution.77  
If children have a legal interest in informational privacy that can be 
undermined by child abuse reporting statutes, certainly adults have no 
lesser legal interest in informational privacy which can be infringed on by 
elder abuse reporting statutes. The question is when such infringements 
are constitutionally permissible. 
Since Nixon,78 the federal courts have used several different balancing 
tests for determining the permissibility of infringements on informational 
privacy rights. The most commonly accepted formulation was set forth by 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation.79 The Westinghouse test calls upon courts to 
consider seven factors in determining whether a given intrusion on 
informational privacy is constitutionally permissible: 
[1] the type of record requested, [2] the information it does or might 
contain, [3] the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual 
disclosure, [4] the injury from disclosure to the relationship in 
which the record was generated, [5] the adequacy of safeguards to 
prevent unauthorized disclosure, [6] the degree of need for access, 
 
 
 75. Id. at 366–67. The reporting statute required certain professionals to file a report with a 
designated state agency regarding any minor “whom he or she knows or reasonably suspects has been 
the victim of child abuse.” Id. at 365. The Attorney General issued an interpretative opinion 
concluding that any “indicia of past or present sexual activity” would “render the minor a child abuse 
victim.” See id. at 366–67. 
 76. Id. at 378. 
 77. Although the Court was not explicit, it appears that it was discussing the right to 
informational privacy as protected by the California State Constitution and that the Court was not 
referring to any federal constitutional right to information privacy. See id. at 381.  
 78. In Nixon, the Supreme Court weighed President Nixon’s privacy interest against the public 
interest in subjecting the President’s materials to archival screening and found the infringement 
constitutionally permissible. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977). In doing 
so, the Court explained that only a small fraction of the materials at issue were personal in nature and 
that the screening procedure was specifically designed to minimize any privacy intrusions. See id. at 
458–65. 
 79. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980); see also 
SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 62, at 402 (noting the prominence of the 
Westinghouse approach); Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Carter, 854 N.E.2d 853, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2006) (using the Westinghouse approach to analyze the minors’ informational privacy claim). 
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and [7] whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated 
public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward 
access. 80 
Evaluating mandatory elder abuse reporting statutes using the 
Westinghouse test calls into serious question the constitutionality of some 
such statutes. To see why this is the case, it is necessary to consider the 
first six Westinghouse factors. The final factor, by contrast, clearly weighs 
in favor of finding mandatory reporting statutes constitutional—after all, 
by definition, states with mandatory elder abuse reporting statutes have an 
express statutory mandate for such reporting.81 
a. Type of Record 
The first factor that the Westinghouse test directs the courts to consider 
is the type of record requested.82 Elder mistreatment reporting statutes 
require the disclosure of a wide range of information, all of it by necessity 
individually identifiable. Pursuant to the terms of the broadest state 
statutes, information from interactions with medical professionals, clergy, 
attorneys, social workers, family, friends, and others is all subject to 
mandatory disclosure. In many cases, the disclosure would involve, or be 
equivalent to, the disclosure of medical records.83 Not only are medical 
professionals among those most frequently singled out as mandated 
reporters, but in many cases reporting elder abuse requires disclosure of 
the alleged victim’s physical or mental condition.84 
Courts tend to see medical records as a type of record in which 
individuals have uncommonly strong privacy interests. Alleged victims of 
elder mistreatment have a strong privacy interest in their medical records. 
Like those of other patients, the medical records of such individuals may 
contain highly sensitive information about their physical, mental, and 
social state—information they might not willingly have shared with 
 
 
 80. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578. 
 81. The fact that the seventh factor unequivocally weighs in favor of finding such statutes 
constitutional is, of course, insufficient to render such statutes constitutional. Allowing this factor to 
trump the other six is inconsistent with the underlying balancing approach embraced by the 
Westinghouse court. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Indiana, 854 N.E.2d at 877 (“[W]e find persuasive 
Judge Herrera’s observations that a state cannot extinguish a federal privacy right by criminalizing 
certain conduct.”). 
 82. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578. 
 83. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 626.557, Subd. 4 (stating that a medical record may be disclosed where 
necessary to comply with mandatory reporting duties). 
 84. See text infra Part III.C.1.b and accompanying footnotes for a discussion of the information 
to be disclosed. 
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anyone other than the health care provider who created those records. The 
potential victim status of the subject of the report does not diminish this 
interest.85  
Individuals may have even more compelling privacy interests in other 
types of information subject to mandatory reporting.86 For example, an 
abuse victim may have a stronger privacy interest in information shared 
with her attorney, despite the fact that attorneys are frequently mandatory 
reporters. Attorney-client confidentiality has long enjoyed protection 
under the common law.87 Violations of attorney-client confidentiality also 
impact constitutionally protected rights. For individuals against whom 
criminal proceedings have been instigated, state interference with the 
confidentiality of attorney-client communications undermines the client’s 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel88 as well as their 
Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. In addition, clients may 
have a constitutionally protected First Amendment interest in confidential 
communications with their attorneys.89 As the Seventh Circuit Court of 
 
 
 85. See Planned Parenthood of Indiana, 854 N.E.2d at 878 (“[V]ictims of criminal activity have 
a heightened expectation of privacy.”); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1991) 
(explaining that a sexual assault victim’s interest in, among other things, privacy regarding his or her 
previous sexual relationship with the defendant may outweigh the defendant’s right to confrontation of 
a victim’s witness).  
 86. States have implicitly recognized this in the child abuse reporting context. See Robin A. 
Rosencrantz, Rejecting “Hear No Evil Speak No Evil”: Expanding the Attorney’s Role in Child Abuse 
Reporting, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327, 345 (“[M]ost states have abrogated the physician-patient 
privilege and the husband-wife privilege in cases of child abuse. . . . By contrast, the attorney-client 
privilege is rarely abrogated and is often excepted from abrogation in the express language of the child 
abuse reporting statutes.”). 
 87. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Court noted:  
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications 
known to the common law. . . . Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication 
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal 
advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the 
lawyer’s being fully informed by the client. 
Id. at 389 (citations omitted); see also Shabnam Akhoundzadeh, Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 J. LEGAL 
ADVOC. & PRAC. 235, 236 (2002) (“The attorney-client privilege has been recognized as ‘the oldest of 
the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.’”); Jill A. Hornstein, 
Comment, Paying the “Traditional Price” of Disclosure: The Third Circuit Rejects Limited Waiver of 
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 467, 469–70 n.18 (1993) (discussing the history of 
the attorney-client privilege and its transition from emphasizing attorneys’ honor to emphasizing 
clients’ protection). 
 88. See generally Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 556–57 (1977) (discussing when state 
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation, and indicating 
that a violation would occur where the intrusion amounted to a disclosure of an otherwise confidential 
communication).  
 89. See Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Because the maintenance of 
confidentiality in attorney-client communications is vital to the ability of an attorney to effectively 
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Appeals explained: “Because the maintenance of confidentiality in 
attorney-client communications is vital to the ability of an attorney to 
effectively counsel her client, interference with this confidentiality 
impedes the client’s First Amendment right to obtain legal advice.”90  
Similarly, individuals may have a heightened privacy interest in 
confidences shared with members of the clergy, who are frequently 
mandated reporters of elder abuse and neglect. The clergy-communicant 
privilege is recognized in all fifty states.91 Although it is an open question 
whether the privilege itself is constitutionally protected,92 requiring clergy 
members to reveal parishioner confidences implicates both informational 
privacy rights93 and the right to free exercise of religion.94 
Records generated in the medical, legal, and religious contexts are 
illustrative of the kinds of private communications whose disclosure is 
required by mandatory reporting statutes, but they are not the only types of 
records whose disclosure may be required despite a victim’s strong 
 
 
counsel her client, interference with this confidentiality impedes the client’s First Amendment right to 
obtain legal advice.”); Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that a public agency’s 
requirement that employees disclose certain communications made to their attorneys violated the 
employees’ First Amendment rights).  
 90. Denius, 209 F.3d at 954. Notably, this line of jurisprudence is the logical extension of the 
Supreme Court’s more general finding that freedom of speech, among other First Amendment rights, 
protects the right to obtain and consult with an attorney. See United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 
12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1967) (“We hold that the freedom of speech, 
assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives petitioner the right 
to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights.”). Accord 
DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The right to retain and consult with an 
attorney . . . implicates not only the Sixth Amendment but also clearly established First Amendment 
rights of association and free speech.”).  
 91. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 382–83 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 92. See R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a Dangerous Person 
Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1627, 1703–04 (2003) 
(discussing whether the privilege is constitutionally required and noting the Supreme Court has not 
directly considered the question). One commentator argued that clergy-communicant communications 
should be afforded greater protection than attorney-client communications because whereas the 
attorney advises the communicant about his or her legal relation to the state or other individuals, the 
clergy advises the communicant about his or her relationship with God, and the state has no interest in 
regulating the latter relationship. See Shawn P. Bailey, Note, How Secrets Are Kept: Viewing the 
Current Clergy-Penitent Privilege Through a Comparison with the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2002 
BYU L. REV. 489. 
 93. But see Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements 
Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 775 (1987) (arguing 
otherwise). 
 94. As early as 1813, a New York court held that requiring a Roman Catholic priest to testify as 
to the identity of a confessed thief would violate the priest’s right under that state’s constitution to 
freely exercise his religion. Id. at 737–38. More recently, numerous law review articles and notes have 
debated whether requiring clergy to report child abuse is constitutional under the free exercise clause. 
See e.g. id. (arguing that some child abuse reporting laws may infringe on clergy members’ free 
exercise of religion).  
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interest in maintaining informational privacy. For example, a victim can 
also have a profound privacy interest in confidences shared with a spouse 
or other family member, yet in some states such persons are nevertheless 
mandated reporters.95 In short, mandatory elder abuse reporting statutes 
require the disclosure of a myriad of types of confidences at least as 
“private” as medical records and arguably even more deserving of 
protection. 
b. Information to be Disclosed 
The second Westinghouse factor focuses on the information that would 
or might be contained in the disclosure,96 and, specifically, the degree to 
which that information is “sensitive.”97 Any report of elder abuse or 
neglect will, by definition, require the disclosure of the fact that an 
individual is being abused or neglected. Information about abuse or 
neglect is likely to be considered by the victim to be highly private in 
nature. It may be information that the victim has never chosen to share or 
has only chosen to share with a family member or confidential advisor. In 
many instances, it may be information to which the government is in no 
other way entitled. Without mandatory reporting statutes requiring 
reporting of self-neglect, for example, it is hard to conceive of the 
government being entitled to information that particular, mentally 
competent adults fail to properly feed, clothe, or clean themselves.  
Not all information about abuse and neglect, however, is equally 
sensitive. In general, the more intimate and personal the information, and 
the more likely disclosure of the information will have adverse 
consequences for the subject, the more “sensitive” it is considered.98 The 
 
 
 95. ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-454(A)–(C) (Supp. 2008); CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630(a) (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3910(a) (2006); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 12-10-3-9(a) (West 2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.030(2)–(6)(a) (LexisNexis 2007); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2 (Supp. 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3477 (Supp. 2008); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 660.255(1) (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-30(A)–(B) (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 43A, § 10-104(A) (West Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-8 (Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 71-6-103(b)(1) (2004); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.051 (Vernon Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 35-20-103(a) (2007); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1034 (West Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 161-F:46 (Supp. 2008). 
 96. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 97. See id. at 579 (when evaluating the second factor, asking whether the information to be 
disclosed was “of such a high degree of sensitivity that the intrusion could be considered severe”). 
 98. The Westinghouse Court implied that information should be considered highly sensitive 
when disclosure was likely to cause adverse effects or when the intrusion would subjectively be 
perceived as “severe” by the subject of that information. See id. Subsequently, courts have used the 
Westinghouse discussion of the importance of medical record privacy to conclude that information 
about an individual’s body and health will generally be considered highly sensitive. See Woods v. 
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sensitivity of information about elder mistreatment, and the degree to 
which it warrants protection, can thus be expected to depend on the nature 
of the mistreatment, the relationship of the abuser and victim, and the 
mental status of the victim. Information about mental or sexual abuse, for 
example, will tend to be more sensitive in nature than information about 
financial exploitation because it is more likely to be of an intimate and 
personal nature. For the same reason, information that an elder is abused 
by a spouse or other close family member will tend to be more sensitive in 
nature than information that an elder is being abused by a paid caregiver. 
Similarly, information about self-neglect will tend to be more sensitive 
than information about abuse or neglect perpetrated by third parties 
because it reveals the “victim’s” personal habits and intimate behavior as 
opposed to the actions of a third party. Finally, information about an elder 
who has the mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of the 
mistreatment will tend to be more sensitive than information about the 
abuse of an elder lacking such capacity because the victim with capacity is 
more likely to be voluntarily withholding information about that 
mistreatment. Voluntary withholding of information, in turn, may reflect 
the elder’s subjective desire to keep the information private or the elder’s 
concerns about adverse consequences of disclosure—both of which would 
suggest that the information is “sensitive.” 
Mandatory elder abuse reporting laws generally do not, however, 
simply require the disclosure of the fact that an individual is abused or 
neglected. Rather, many require the disclosure of a good deal of 
information beyond the mere suspicion of abuse. States commonly require 
the disclosure of the victim’s name and contact information, the victim’s 
mental or physical health, and any information the reporter considers 
pertinent or that will facilitate the investigation.99 Some states also require 
 
 
White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (“[I]nformation about one’s body and state of health 
is particularly sensitive, and . . . such information has traditionally been treated differently from other 
types of personal information.”); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 383 (D.N.J. 1990) 
(same).  
 99. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(C) (2008). Arizona requires disclosure of:  
1. The names and addresses of the adult and any persons having control or custody of the 
adult, if known. 2. The adult’s age and the nature and extent of his incapacity or vulnerability. 
3. The nature and extent of the adult’s injuries or physical neglect or of the exploitation of the 
adult’s property. 4. Any other information that the person reporting believes might be helpful 
in establishing the cause of the adult’s injuries or physical neglect or of the exploitation of the 
adult’s property. 
Id. Colorado requires disclosure of:  
The name and address of the at-risk adult; the name and address of the at-risk adult’s 
caretaker, if any; the age, if known, of such at-risk adult; the nature and extent of such at-risk 
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adult’s injury, if any; the nature and extent of the condition that will reasonably result in 
mistreatment or self-neglect; and any other pertinent information. 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-3.1-102(2) (West Supp. 2008). Florida requires: 
To the extent possible, a report . . . must contain, but need not be limited to, the following 
information: 1. Name, age, race, sex, physical description, and location of each victim alleged 
to have been abused, neglected, or exploited. 2. Names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 
the victim’s family members. 3. Name, address, and telephone number of each alleged 
perpetrator. 4. Name, address, and telephone number of the caregiver of the victim, if 
different from the alleged perpetrator. 5. Name, address, and telephone number of the person 
reporting the alleged abuse, neglect, or exploitation. 6. Description of the physical or 
psychological injuries sustained. 7. Actions taken by the reporter, if any, such as notification 
of the criminal justice agency. 8. Any other information available to the reporting person 
which may establish the cause of abuse, neglect, or exploitation that occurred or is occurring. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1034(1)(b) (West Supp. 2008). Georgia requires: 
The report shall include the name and address of the disabled adult or elder person and should 
include the name and address of the disabled adult’s or elder person’s caretaker, the age of the 
disabled adult or elder person, the nature and extent of the disabled adult’s or elder person’s 
injury or condition resulting from abuse, exploitation, or neglect, and other pertinent 
information. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-4(b)(2) (2007). Kansas requires:  
The report . . . shall contain the name and address of the person making the report and of the 
caretaker caring for the involved adult, the name and address of the involved adult, 
information regarding the nature and extent of the abuse, neglect or exploitation, the name of 
the next of kin of the involved adult, if known, and any other information which the person 
making the report believes might be helpful in the investigation of the case and the protection 
of the involved adult. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1431(b) (2000). Kentucky requires:  
Any person making such a report shall provide the following information, if known: (a) The 
name and address of the adult, or of any other person responsible for his care; (b) The age of 
the adult; (c) The nature and extent of the abuse, neglect, or exploitation, including any 
evidence of previous abuse, neglect, or exploitation; (d) The identity of the perpetrator, if 
known; (e) The identity of the complainant, if possible; and (f) Any other information that the 
person believes might be helpful in establishing the cause of abuse, neglect, or exploitation. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.030(4) (LexisNexis 2007). Maryland requires: 
Insofar as is reasonably possible . . . a report . . . shall include . . . : (1) the name, age, and 
home address of the alleged vulnerable adult; (2) the name and home address of the person 
responsible for the care of the alleged vulnerable adult; (3) the whereabouts of the alleged 
vulnerable adult; (4) the nature of the alleged vulnerable adult’s incapacity; (5) the nature and 
extent of the abuse, neglect, self-neglect, or exploitation of the alleged vulnerable adult, 
including evidence or information available to the reporter concerning previous injury 
possibly resulting from abuse, neglect, self-neglect, or exploitation; and (6) any other 
information that would help to determine: (i) the cause of the suspected abuse, neglect, self-
neglect, or exploitation; and (ii) the identity of any individual responsible for the abuse, 
neglect, self-neglect, or exploitation. 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 14-302(d) (LexisNexis 2006). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-
451(b) (West 2006) (requiring disclosure of the “name and address of the involved elderly person, 
information regarding the nature and extent of the abuse, neglect, exploitation or abandonment, and 
any other information which the reporter believes might be helpful in an investigation of the case and 
the protection of such elderly person.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5304(1) (2002) (“If known, the report 
shall contain the name and address of the vulnerable adult; the caretaker; the alleged perpetrator; the 
nature and extent of suspected abuse, neglect or exploitation; and any other information that will be of 
assistance in the investigation.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2D(2) (Supp. 2009) (“All reports 
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disclosure of the basis for the reporters’ suspicions,100 which effectively 
requires the reporter to disclose information about her relationship with 
the victim (for example, an attorney-client or psychologist-patient 
relationship). 
c. Potential Harm from Subsequent Disclosure 
The third Westinghouse factor is the potential harm in any “subsequent 
nonconsensual disclosure” (i.e., disclosures that might follow a report of 
abuse).101 Harms stemming from such disclosure of reports of elder 
mistreatment, as the functional critique of mandatory elder abuse reporting 
has recognized,102 could take a number of forms. Disclosure could have a 
“chilling effect” on the willingness of mistreated elders to seek basic care 
or services, or on the willingness of their caregivers to permit them or help 
 
 
shall contain the name and address of the adult, the name and address of the person responsible for the 
care of the adult, if available, and any other pertinent information [excepting the name of the suspected 
perpetrators].”). 
 100. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-10(c) (West 2007) (requiring reports to include, if 
known, “The name, address, and telephone number of the reporter and the basis of the reporter’s 
knowledge.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5094 (Supp. 2008) (a report must include, among other 
specified information, “The basis of the reporter’s belief that the older person or vulnerable person has 
been abused, neglected, exploited or isolated.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.61(C) (West 2001) 
(requiring disclosure of, among other information, “The basis of the reporter’s belief that the adult has 
been abused, neglected, or exploited.”). In Texas: 
The report may be made orally or in writing. It shall include: (1) the name, age, and address 
of the elderly or disabled person; (2) the name and address of any person responsible for the 
elderly or disabled person’s care; (3) the nature and extent of the elderly or disabled person’s 
condition; (4) the basis of the reporter’s knowledge; and (5) any other relevant information. 
TEXAS HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.051(d) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Wyoming requires: 
The report shall provide . . . the following, to the extent available: (i) The name, age and 
address of the vulnerable adult; (ii) The name and address of any person responsible for the 
vulnerable adult’s care; (iii) The nature and extent of the vulnerable adult’s condition; (iv) 
The basis of the reporter’s knowledge; (v) The names and conditions of the other residents, if 
the vulnerable adult resides in a facility with other vulnerable adults; (vi) An evaluation of the 
persons responsible for the care of the residents, if the vulnerable adult resides in a facility 
with other vulnerable adults; (vii) The adequacy of the facility environment; (viii) Any 
evidence of previous injuries; (ix) Any collaborative information; and (x) Any other relevant 
information. 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-103(b) (2008). The District of Columbia also takes this approach, requiring 
disclosure of, if known: 
The name, age, physical description, and location of the adult alleged to be in need of 
protective services; the name and location of the person(s) allegedly responsible for the abuse, 
neglect, or exploitation; the nature and extent of the abuse, neglect, self-neglect, or 
exploitation; the basis of the reporter’s knowledge; and any other information the reporter 
believes might be helpful to an investigation. 
D.C. CODE § 7-1903(c) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 101. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578. 
 102. See discussion supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
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them to do so. A parallel effect was recognized as legally significant by 
the Indiana Appellate Court in Planned Parenthood of Indiana. The court 
explained that requiring disclosure of minors’ medical records created 
“significant potential for harm in a subsequent nonconsensual disclosure” 
because it might have a “chilling effect” on patients who would be 
reluctant to continue to receive services from Planned Parenthood of 
Indiana.103  
Release of such information could also result in reputational injury or 
stigma. The labeling of an individual as an abuse victim may be treated as 
evidence of that person’s diminished capacity or worth, and this may, in 
turn, affect his or her social standing and the respect and treatment 
received from others. This is particularly true when the mistreatment 
alleged is neglect or self-neglect. Allegations that an individual lives in 
squalor, fails to maintain personal hygiene, or is too demented to meet his 
or her own needs may be the ultimate affront to the individual’s sense of 
personal dignity. Perhaps most importantly, the release of such 
information has the potential to trigger processes that lead to the 
diminution of the alleged victim’s legal rights. An elder reported to be the 
victim of third party mistreatment or of self-neglect may face the prospect 
of being cajoled or forced to leave his or her home and move instead to a 
long-term care facility. Indeed, institutionalization is among the most 
common interventions used in cases of elder mistreatment,104 and 
involuntary institutionalization can occur even if the victim has not been 
adjudicated mentally incompetent.105 Individuals who are subjects of elder 
mistreatment reports also face the prospect of being stripped of their right 
to make financial and personal decisions for themselves, as guardianship is 
 
 
 103. Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Carter, 854 N.E.2d 853, 879–80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 104. Ailee Moon et al., Elder Abuse & Neglect Among Veterans in Greater Los Angeles: 
Prevalence, Types, & Intervention Outcomes, in ELDER ABUSE & MISTREATMENT: POLICY, PRACTICE 
& RESEARCH, supra note 20 (M. Joanna Mellor & Patricia Brownell eds., 2006) (finding that the most 
common intervention for abused or neglected veterans in an outpatient clinic at a Los Angeles-based 
Veteran’s Medical Center was to move the victims into a long-term care facility); Margaret F. Hudson, 
Elder Mistreatment: Current Research, in ELDER ABUSE: CONFLICT IN THE FAMILY, supra note 52, at 
125, 130 (in reviewing research on the treatment offered to victims of elder abuse, discussing a study 
that found that institutionalization was the treatment mechanism used for 46% of identified elder abuse 
victims). Cf. Crystal, supra note 52, at 338 (noting that the “cure” offered to victims of elder abuse 
may be perceived by the victim to be “worse than the disease”). 
 105. Mental incapacity is not necessarily required. Rather, in some states “need” for services may 
be sufficient. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. §§ 38-9-2(2), 38-9-6 (Supp. 2008). Alabama allows a court to 
order protective services be provided to an adult whom the court determines “because of physical or 
mental impairment, is unable to protect himself or herself from abuse, neglect, exploitation, sexual 
abuse, or emotional abuse by others, and who has no guardian, relative, or other appropriate person 
able, willing, and available to assume the kind and degree of protection and supervision required under 
the circumstances.” Id. 
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another common intervention.106 Moreover, the disclosure of abuse 
allegations can trigger such processes even if the state agency responsible 
for investigating elder abuse determines that state intervention is not 
appropriate.107  
d. Injury to the Relationship 
Under the Westinghouse approach, the courts must consider whether 
and how disclosure may damage the relationship between the alleged 
victim and the person required to report.108 In some cases, the 
consequences to such relationships could be devastating. Consider the 
relationship between an elderly abuse victim and her doctor. Suppose the 
victim reveals to her doctor that her caretaker son pushes her around, but 
tells her doctor not to tell anyone. By reporting the abuse, the doctor not 
only violates her trust but may make it impossible for the victim to 
continue to see him if the son learns of the report and pressures or forces 
her to transfer to another physician. Similarly, suppose a trusts and estates 
lawyer is visited by an elderly man who is a dialysis patient. The man 
explains that he and his wife had agreed that he would stay at home and 
she would care for him, but he now realizes that he should move to a long-
term care facility. He asks the attorney to advise him on long-term care 
planning and Medicaid eligibility. The attorney, seeking to understand the 
man’s urgency and time frame, asks him why he has suddenly changed his 
mind. He replies that lately the around-the-clock care has taken too much 
of a toll on his wife and she slapped him in frustration. Under the current 
law of many states, that attorney must now report elder abuse to the local 
authorities. The consequences for the relationship between attorney and 
client are likely to be severe—one could expect the client to feel he can no 
longer trust the attorney and to end the representation.  
 
 
 106. Moon et al., supra note 104 (finding that the second most common intervention for abused or 
neglected veterans in an outpatient client at a Los Angeles based Veteran’s Medical Center was to be 
placed under conservatorship); see also Faulkner, supra note 48, at 85 (explaining why elders reported 
to be abused or neglected have good reason to fear unwanted institutionalization or guardianship). 
 107. For example, after learning of suspected financial exploitation, the alleged victim’s heirs may 
attempt to limit her ability to manage her own affairs by seeking to obtain a guardianship over her. 
Similarly, the family of an individual reportedly engaging in self-neglect may seek to have the 
individual involuntarily institutionalized, or may pressure the individual to consent to 
institutionalization, even if APS believes the alleged victim has the capacity to refuse such a move. 
 108. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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e. Adequacy of Safeguards  
Under the Westinghouse approach, courts must consider “the adequacy 
of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure.”109 In Planned 
Parenthood of Indiana, the court found that the fact that the state agency 
requesting the minors’ medical records was under a statutory duty to 
safeguard the requested information was insufficient to protect against 
unauthorized disclosure. The court examined the agency’s procedures in 
some detail, noting that “there is no indication that [the agency] restricts 
access to the records to those involved in the investigation or that its 
employees have received any training in confidentiality regulations or 
procedures.”110 The court also observed that the state agency receiving 
reports was not subject to civil or criminal penalties for breaching its 
safeguarding duties.111  
The same concerns exist with regard to some states’ elder mistreatment 
reporting schemes. For example, Rhode Island’s mandatory reporting 
statute simply states that reports received by the state will be confidential 
unless it is necessary to share them with other state agencies in order to 
further protect the elderly person.112 By comparison, Rhode Island 
provides a more structured approach for protecting the confidentiality of 
mandated reports of child abuse. Specifically, for reports of child abuse, 
Rhode Island law states that “[t]here shall be established a central registry 
within the department . . . [which] shall take all necessary precautions to 
assure confidentiality of records protected by this chapter.”113 Similarly, 
although Rhode Island’s child abuse reporting statutes indicate that any 
person or agency that violates the confidentiality rule “shall be subject to 
civil sanctions,” 114 the state’s mandatory reporting statute for elder abuse 
is silent as to whether someone who disseminates confidential information 
to a non-authorized party may be held liable.  
A number of other states, by contrast, have made significant efforts to 
protect the confidentiality of reports of elder mistreatment. For example, 
 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Carter, 854 N.E.2d 853, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 111. Id. 
 112. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-10 (Supp. 2008) (“The director may . . . disclose to the attorney 
general, any local state, or federal police officials, appropriate courts, state departments, public or 
private agencies, or medical personnel, pertinent information that is necessary to investigate reports of 
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or self-neglect, the coordination of needed services, the protection of the 
elderly victim or criminal prosecution.”). 
 113. Id. § 42-72-7(a). 
 114. Id. § 42-72-8(f) (The “civil sanctions” to which this statute refers are laid out in § 5-37.3-
9(a), and consist only of liability for “actual and exemplary damages.”). 
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Texas statutes provide that reports of elder abuse and neglect, the identity 
of the person making the report, and all communications regarding the 
investigation of the report are to remain confidential.115 As required by 
Texas statute,116 the state has adopted regulations specifically identifying 
those agencies with which such reports may be shared as well as those 
agencies which may view redacted versions of abuse reports.117 The state 
agency receiving reports reserves the right to withhold such information if 
an investigation would be compromised or a life would be threatened by 
the release of such information.118 In addition, Texas regulations firmly 
state that records remain confidential even when shared and make 
improper release of records a criminal offense.119 
f. Need for Access 
The sixth Westinghouse factor is “the degree of need for access.”120 A 
government desiring to fully meet the needs of its vulnerable elders has an 
important and legitimate interest in information identifying elders who are 
suspected to be victims of mistreatment. This interest, however, is not 
equally compelling across all cases of mistreatment. Rather, its strength 
depends in part on the type of abuse alleged and the mental capacity of the 
alleged victim. 
The governmental interest is strongest where a third party is 
mistreating an elder who lacks capacity to understand and appreciate the 
nature of the abuse, or to seek assistance. Here, the government may have 
a significant need for access in order to prevent further abuse, punish the 
transgressor, and provide protection to an individual unable to protect 
himself or herself. By comparison, where another person is victimizing an 
elder who understands the nature and consequences of the mistreatment 
and who has capacity to seek assistance but who does not wish the report 
to be made, the government’s interest is weaker. Although the government 
retains an interest in enforcing its laws and punishing the transgressor, its 
interest in protecting the elder is significantly diminished both because the 
 
 
 115. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.101(a)(1)–(3) (Vernon Supp. 2008). 
 116. Id. § 48.101(g), (g-1). 
 117. See 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 705.7101, 705.7109 (1999). 
 118. See id. §§ 705.7107, 705.7109, 705.7113. 
 119. Id. § 705.7123. According to TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.005(e) (Vernon 2001), release 
of confidential information to unauthorized persons is a Class A misdemeanor. 
 120. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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elder is less vulnerable and because the elder has a countervailing interest 
in self-determination.121 
The government’s interest is even weaker in situations involving self-
neglect, that is, where the individual at risk is failing to meet his or her 
own needs. Unlike other forms of abuse or neglect, which might rise to the 
level of a crime, no crime is involved in self-neglect and thus the 
government’s interest is limited to protecting the elder.122 The interest is 
also diminished because self-neglect situations involve self-regarding 
behavior. Consistent with a liberal political tradition, to the extent that the 
government has any legitimate interest in possessing information about 
self-regarding behavior, that interest is significantly diminished relative to 
information about other-regarding behavior.123 Unless the individual has 
diminished capacity, the government is unlikely to have an interest 
sufficient to justify infringing on the individual’s liberty simply in order to 
stop a destructive self-regarding behavior.124  
In addition to varying by type of mistreatment, a state’s interest in its 
mandatory reporting scheme depends on the expected effectiveness of that 
scheme. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier in the context of the functional 
critique of mandatory reporting statutes, such laws could have 
counterproductive and even harmful effects on older adults by reducing 
their access to care, increasing their isolation, and disempowering them.125 
Moreover, mandatory reporting laws appear relatively ineffective at 
 
 
 121. Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in MILL: THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE, ON LIBERTY, THE 
SUBJUGATION OF WOMEN 48 (Alan Ryan ed., 1997) (distinguishing the state’s right in interfering with 
the self-regarding behavior of persons with full mental faculties and those whom Mills believed lacked 
such faculties).  
 122. The broader the definition of self-neglect, the more limited the government’s interest. Some 
would have the state view self-neglect so broadly as to make the term virtually meaningless. See L. 
René Bergeron, Self-Determination and Elder Abuse: Do We Know Enough?, in ELDER ABUSE & 
MISTREATMENT: POLICY, PRACTICE & RESEARCH, supra note 20, at 81, 86 (“Self-neglect also 
includes the collection of either valuable or worthless items, or the collection of animals without the 
provision to provide them with proper care.”). 
 123. As John Stuart Mill eloquently argued, “[t]he only part of the conduct of anyone for which he 
is amenable to society is that which concerns others. . . . Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign.” MILL, supra note 121, at 48. 
 124. Of course, which category a particular case of elder mistreatment falls into may be debatable. 
Many aging service providers and victim advocates would point to the influence that abusers have over 
their victims and query whether victims have capacity to self-determine while experiencing 
victimization. See, e.g., Bergeron, supra note 122, at 94–95 (arguing that it is not reasonable to expect 
people who are “isolated, depressed, sick, and in crisis” to self-determine and suggesting that a wide 
range of elder abuse victims not be treated as if they are capable of self-determination). Similarly, 
situations labeled “self-neglect” by some, might be labeled third-party neglect by others who view 
third party duties and omissions more broadly.  
 125. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
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achieving their primary goal: increasing reports of elder mistreatment.126 A 
1991 Government Accounting Office report comparing mandatory and 
voluntary reporting schemes cast serious doubt on the value of mandating 
the reporting of elder abuse. It concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to determine whether mandatory reporting schemes were more 
effective than voluntary ones.127 Other studies have produced similar 
results.128 Compared to mandatory reporting requirements, other 
mechanisms may be significantly more effective at increasing the 
detection of elder abuse. For example, public education about elder abuse 
is associated with higher reporting rates.129 If would-be reporters cannot 
identify signs of abuse or are unaware of those to whom to report 
suspected abuse, they cannot be expected to report even if legally required 
to do so. Since many would-be reporters lack the basic information needed 
to identify elder abuse,130 training those who work with older adults to 
identify such abuse may be a far more effective detection strategy than 
mandating reporting. Similarly, developing effective responses to reports 
of mistreatment also has the potential to significantly increase reporting. 
As research on child maltreatment reporting suggests, individuals are 
significantly more likely to report abuse or neglect if they expect a 
satisfactory response to that report.131 Therefore, improving the 
 
 
 126. See Jeanette M. Daly et al., Mandatory Reporting: Relationship of APS Statute Language on 
State Reported Elder Abuse, 15 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 1, 2 (2003) (“The impetus for mandatory 
reporting legislation is to improve case detection.”). Notably, were the purpose to prevent or treat elder 
abuse, such statutes would likely appear even less effective. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
ELDER ABUSE: EFFECTIVENESS OF REPORTING LAWS & OTHER FACTORS 2 (1991) (finding general 
agreement among experts that mandatory elder abuse reporting statutes are not a particularly effective 
method for identifying, preventing, or treating elder abuse). 
 127. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 126, at 2. 
 128. See, e.g., SANDRA L. HUGHES, CAN BANK TELLERS TELL?—LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO 
BANKS REPORTING FINANCIAL ABUSE OF THE ELDERLY 44 (2003), available at http://www.ncea.aoa. 
gov/NCEAroot/ Main_Site/pdf/publication/bank_reporting_long_final_52703.pdf (finding, in a study 
of laws requiring banks to report suspected financial exploitation of older adults, that “[e]nactment of a 
mandatory reporting law alone does not seem to result in a significant increase in reporting by banks” 
and “the absence of mandatory reporting [in states without mandatory reporting laws] has not been a 
major obstacle to developing a successful bank reporting project,” and concluding that “efforts are 
better directed at securing the cooperation of the banking industry than toward attempting to enact a 
mandatory reporting law.”). 
 129. See ELDER ABUSE PROJECT, AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASSOC., & NAT’L ASSOC. OF 
STATE UNITS ON AGING, A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED 
TO ELDER ABUSE, REPORT NO. 3, at 87 (1986); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 126, 
at 9 (citing public and professional awareness regarding elder mistreatment as key in preventing such 
mistreatment). 
 130. Cf. Kohn, supra note 5, at 188–89 (discussing studies showing the relative lack of training 
about elder mistreatment relative to training about child maltreatment).  
 131. See id. at 190; see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 126, at 7 (indicating 
that the reputation of elder abuse agencies affects reporting rates). 
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effectiveness and appropriateness of APS agency responses to elder abuse 
reports is critical to increasing reporting rates.132 In addition, increased 
responsiveness by the judicial system might increase the rate at which 
reports are made.133 As one of the nation’s leading elder abuse experts has 
noted, “when the word gets out that a prosecutor is willing to prosecute 
elder abuse cases, or that the police are willing to investigate such cases, 
the number of reports rises, presumably because reporting is then believed 
to be a meaningful recourse, thus making it a worthwhile endeavor.”134 In 
short, there appear to be other methods for increasing detection of 
mistreatment that are more effective than mandating reporting.135  
g. The Sum of the Factors 
A review of mandatory reporting statutes in light of the Westinghouse 
factors strongly suggests that at least a subset of state mandatory elder 
mistreatment reporting statutes contain unconstitutional provisions. Rhode 
Island’s mandatory reporting scheme is among those that are the most 
constitutionally suspect. Rhode Island requires reporting of all types of 
mistreatment (including self-neglect), requires all categories of persons to 
report regardless of the anticipated impact of the report, and makes age the 
only criterion for determining about whom reports must be made.136 
Moreover, the statutory scheme provides virtually no protection to ensure 
that reports are kept confidential.137 The effect is that, in Rhode Island, an 
individual’s ability to engage in private communications is fundamentally 
altered upon reaching age sixty regardless of whether the behavior from 
which the state seeks to protect the individual is inflicted by herself or 
another person and regardless of her mental or physical capacities.  
Unlike Rhode Island’s scheme, Wisconsin’s mandatory elder abuse 
reporting scheme raises only minimal constitutional concerns. Wisconsin 
created a very narrow category of persons subject to reports. Reporting is 
only required where the subject of the report is “at imminent risk of 
 
 
 132. See Kohn, supra note 5, at 190. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Marie-Therese Connelly, Where Elder Abuse and the Justice System Collide: Police 
Power, Parens Patrie and Twelve Recommendations (Feb. 2008 draft) (on file with author). 
 135. Advocates of mandatory reporting sometimes describe it as creating an “opportunity for 
public education” and thus as a key element of a public awareness campaign. Although it may be 
helpful to tell those whom one wishes to educate that the education will help them comply with legal 
duties, mandatory reporting should not be treated as a pre-requisite for elder abuse education. Indeed, 
professional training about elder mistreatment could be required without requiring reporting. 
 136. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-8 (Supp. 2008).  
 137. See id. § 42-66-10 and discussion supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
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serious bodily harm, death, sexual assault, or significant property loss and 
is unable to make an informed judgment about whether to report the risk” 
or where another person is at risk of such harms from the suspected 
perpetrator.138 Moreover, as discussed previously, Wisconsin makes 
exceptions to its reporting requirement for situations in which reporting 
would not be in the best interest of the victim.139 In addition, unlike many 
other states, Wisconsin does not specify what information must be 
included in a mandated report and thus allows for the disclosure of 
significantly less information than many states. Wisconsin also 
significantly limits the types of records that must be disclosed as its 
mandatory reporting provisions apply only to a relatively small set of 
professionals.140 Although Wisconsin allows records of abuse to be shared 
with a variety of persons and organizations, it delineates limited purposes 
for which such shared information may be used.141 Furthermore, access to 
records of elder abuse may be denied where not in the best interest of the 
victim or alleged victim.142 Thus, Wisconsin limits mandatory reporting to 
situations in which the government’s interest in receiving reports of 
mistreatment is especially great, and also minimizes the extent to which 
reporting burdens individuals’ privacy interests. 
Florida’s statute, by contrast, raises fewer concerns than Rhode 
Island’s, but is more troubling than Wisconsin’s. In Florida, all persons 
with knowledge or reasonable suspicion of abuse, neglect, or exploitation 
are mandatory reporters143 and are required to divulge extensive 
information, including any “which may establish the cause of abuse, 
neglect, or exploitation that occurred or is occurring.”144 The category of 
persons subject to mandatory reporting is narrower than that in Rhode 
Island because Florida’s requirements apply only to “vulnerable adults” 
and not to all persons over the age of sixty.145 However, Florida fails to 
limit the subjects of mandatory reporting to persons who lack the mental 
capacity to understand their own abuse and neglect, but rather defines 
vulnerability to include persons whose ability to perform activities of daily 
 
 
 138. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.90(4) (West Supp. 2008). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (listing as mandated reporters employees of any entity that is licensed, certified, or 
approved by or registered with a particular governmental agency; health care providers; and social 
workers, professional counselors, and marriage and family therapists).  
 141. Id. § 46.90(6). 
 142. Id.  
 143. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1034(1)(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
 144. See id. § 415.1034(1)(b). 
 145. See id. § 415.102(26). 
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living are limited by physical disabilities or “infirmities of aging.”146 
Moreover, Florida, like Rhode Island, requires reporting of self-neglect.147 
Florida requires that records remain confidential, but creates numerous 
exceptions to this rule which allow for the release of complete records to, 
among other people, legislative staff, a broad range of state employees, the 
victim’s caregiver, and the suspected perpetrator.148 
To the extent that the Westinghouse factors are treated as non-
exclusive, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has indicated they 
should,149 the number of constitutionally questionable statutes might 
increase. In In re Crawford, the Ninth Circuit explained:  
This [Westinghouse] list is not exhaustive, and the relevant 
considerations will necessarily vary from case to case. In each case, 
however, the government has the burden of showing that “its use of 
the information would advance a legitimate state interest and that its 
actions are narrowly tailored to meet the legitimate interest.”150  
In the case of mandatory reporting, an additional consideration might be 
that alleged victims may be subject to other infringements on their liberties 
as a result of mandated reports.151  
The conclusion that a subset of mandatory reporting statutes 
unconstitutionally violate elders’ rights, however, does not depend on the 
application of the Westinghouse approach. The same conclusion can be 
reached using the “legitimate expectation of privacy” approach152 that the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals used in Aid for Women.153 As the Tenth 
 
 
 146. See id. § 415.102(26). 
 147. See id. § 415.102(15). 
 148. Id. § 415.107. 
 149. In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 150. Id. (quoting Doe v. Attorney Gen., 991 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 151. Cf. Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and 
Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 102 (1996) (arguing that “the infringement 
of other liberties by sex offender community notification and registration requirements combined with 
the privacy infringement may collectively violate the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 152. The “legitimate expectation of privacy” approach is sometimes referred to as the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” approach. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 219 n.4 (1986) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (“Since Katz [v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)] our decisions also have described 
constitutionally protected privacy interests as those that society regards as ‘legitimate,’ using the 
words ‘reasonable’ and ‘legitimate’ interchangeably.”); see also Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New 
Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. 
REV. 507, 517 n.54 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court “seems to indiscriminately waffle between 
phrasing the requirement a ‘reasonable’ expectation of privacy and a ‘legitimate’ expectation of 
privacy, leaving uncertain whether the test is meant to be empirical, as suggested by the former term, 
or normative, as suggested by the latter.”).  
 153. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2006). The Aid for Women court 
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Circuit explained, under this approach “[a]n individual is . . . protected 
from disclosure of information where the individual ‘has a legitimate 
expectation . . . that it will remain confidential.’”154 An individual has such 
an expectation where she or he has “an actual, subjective expectation of 
privacy” and society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.155 Thus, 
the “legitimate expectation of privacy test” embodies the same 
considerations as the Westinghouse test. Westinghouse also requires courts 
to consider an individual’s privacy expectation (reflected in the first five 
Westinghouse factors) and society’s judgment as to whether that 
expectation is reasonable under the circumstances (reflected in the last two 
Westinghouse factors). Not surprisingly, then, the two approaches can be 
expected to lead to the same conclusion: that mandatory reporting statutes 
can unconstitutionally violate alleged victims’ informational privacy 
rights. Analyzed using the legitimate expectation of privacy approach, the 
potential unconstitutionality of such statutes can be identified simply by 
recognizing that many of the reports required under mandatory reporting 
statutes would necessitate the disclosure of information (for example, 
medical records, conversations with a priest, consultations with an 
attorney) that reasonable people would expect to be kept confidential. It is, 
for example, reasonable for a patient to expect that her doctor will not 
disclose her medical information without her consent unless needed to 
prevent imminent harm.156  
2. Additional Constitutional Rights  
The constitutional interest most directly affected by mandatory 
reporting statutes is that in informational privacy, but other constitutional 
interests are also undermined by such statutes. For example, elder abuse 
reporting statutes that allow the state to access alleged victims’ homes or 
 
 
suggested that a more rigorous test would have been appropriate had the rights of adults been 
implicated. Id. at 1120. 
 154. Id. at 1116 (quoting Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
 155. See Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Carter, 854 N.E.2d 853, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) 
(quoting Hanney v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)); see also Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule [for determining 
when a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred] that has emerged from prior decisions is that there 
is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”). 
 156. The existence of the federal Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA), 
which limits disclosures of medical records, points to the reasonableness of such expectations. 
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property over their objections implicate elders’ interests in physical 
privacy. 157 
Arguably, mandatory elder abuse reporting laws also implicate seniors’ 
constitutional right to equal protection of the law. Starting with its 1976 
decision in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,158 the Supreme 
Court has consistently refused to subject age-based classifications to 
heightened scrutiny.159 All of the Court’s relevant cases, however, 
considered age discrimination in the employment context. It is debatable 
whether they closed the door to finding age a suspect classification in 
certain non-employment contexts.160 Although the Murgia holding is so 
broadly stated that it is generally seen as foreclosing such a possibility,161 
the already faulty reasoning of the Murgia opinion is further undercut by 
modern elder protection statutes and, in particular, by mandatory elder 
abuse reporting statutes. The Murgia court based its decision that age was 
 
 
 157. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-229 (2008) (giving those investigating reports of abuse the 
right to “visit” with the alleged victim and the right to enter into the alleged victim’s home without a 
warrant under certain situations). Similarly, in Iowa: 
Upon a showing of probable cause that a dependent adult has been abused, a court may 
authorize a person, also authorized by the department, to make an evaluation, to enter the 
residence of, and to examine the dependent adult. Upon a showing of probable cause that a 
dependent adult has been financially exploited, a court may authorize a person, also 
authorized by the department, to make an evaluation, and to gain access to the financial 
records of the dependent adult. 
IOWA CODE § 235B.3(7) (West 2008). 
 158. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
 159. In Murgia, the Court rejected the claim that Massachusetts’ mandatory retirement age for 
police officers violated the officers right to equal protection. The Court explained that “uniformed state 
police officers over 50” did not constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. Id. 
at 313–14. Subsequently, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), the Supreme Court held that a 
Missouri constitutional provision setting a mandatory retirement age for judges did not violate equal 
protection. Similarly, in Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979), the Court upheld a federal statute 
setting a mandatory retirement age for federal employees covered by the Foreign Service retirement 
and disability system against an equal protection challenge because the plaintiffs failed to show the 
statute to be irrational.  
 160. Scholars have not yet fully explored the extent to which Murgia might not control in non-
employment contexts, although Howard Eglit has considered the constitutionality of age 
discrimination in the health care context, arguing that: 
Murgia and Vance . . . demonstrate that in the employment setting, at least, the Supreme 
Court has had no problem with the notion that those who have accumulated too many years 
legitimately can be required to sacrifice a desirable government-created and -funded 
commodity—albeit one not fundamentally important for constitutional purposes—in order to 
make that commodity available for younger successors. 
Howard Eglit, Health Care Allocation for the Elderly: Health Care Discrimination by Another Name?, 
26 HOUS. L. REV. 813, 842 (1989). 
 161. See, e.g., HOWARD EGLIT, ELDERS ON TRIAL: AGE & AGEISM IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 127 (2004) (“[I]t is too late in the day to mount a successful challenge to the application of a 
minimum rationality test to age classification . . . . That battle was first was lost in . . . Murgia.”). 
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not a suspect class on, among other things, the Court’s determination that 
the elderly “have not experienced a ‘history of purposeful unequal 
treatment’ or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of 
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”162 Yet, at 
least some mandatory reporting schemes create unique disabilities on the 
basis of stereotyped characteristics by selectively limiting the rights of 
older adults to engage in certain forms of confidential communications, 
and by responding to reports of elder abuse in ways that target older adults 
for interventions such as institutionalization or guardianship that can 
diminish their legal rights. 
If the courts are unwilling to depart from the Murgia line of cases and 
commit to applying traditional, highly deferential rational basis scrutiny, 
however, a successful challenge based on equal protection grounds would 
be unlikely. The Supreme Court has explained, in the absence of a suspect 
or quasi-suspect classification, “where individuals in the group affected by 
a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has 
the authority to implement . . . the Equal Protection Clause requires only a 
rational means to serve a legitimate end.”163 Under this formulation, the 
question is, therefore, whether older age is relevant to the ends the state is 
attempting to achieve. To the extent that the state can legitimately prefer to 
protect some of its citizens over others of its citizens—perhaps in this case 
because older adults are perceived as more deserving of special 
protection164—such distinctions would likely be found permissible. That 
said, the emergence of what Julie Nice has termed the “third strand” of 
equal protection jurisprudence might present an opportunity to 
successfully challenge such laws even if courts are unwilling to apply 
heightened scrutiny to all age-based classifications.165 Nice explains that in 
certain situations in which the Supreme Court has been confronted with 
equal protection challenges in which “fairly important rights” were denied 
to “relatively vulnerable groups,” the Court has used a “third strand” of 
analysis and implicitly applied heightened scrutiny even though no 
fundamental rights, quasi-suspect classifications, or suspect classifications 
were implicated.166 Mandatory reporting statutes are arguably a prime 
example of such a situation: they involve a relatively vulnerable group 
 
 
 162. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313. 
 163. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985). 
 164. By comparison, a distinction based on “vulnerability” may not be rational, at least as long as 
the targeted group includes persons as young as sixty or sixty-five. 
 165. See Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: 
Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209 (1999).  
 166. See id. at 1212. 
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being denied important rights that arguably fall just shy of being 
fundamental.167  
D. Conclusion 
Examining mandatory elder abuse reporting statutes through a 
constitutional lens suggests that certain such statutes impermissibly 
infringe on constitutionally protected privacy rights. Other such statutes 
may not rise to the level of impermissibly burdening constitutional rights 
but may nevertheless impose significant burdens on constitutionally 
protected interests. Thus, the manner in which such statutes burden elders’ 
liberty is not only an ethical, ideological, or moral concern, but also a legal 
one. 
IV. PROHIBITIONS ON ELDER SEXUAL ABUSE 
Mandatory reporting statutes are not the only component of elder 
protection schemes with the potential to violate senior citizens’ 
constitutionally protected civil rights. The next Part of this Article 
provides a second case study of statutes with such potential. Specifically, 
it looks at a series of statutes that have been adopted to protect older adults 
from sexual mistreatment. Sexual mistreatment of the elderly is a real and 
serious problem,168 and efforts to curb it are well-intentioned. 
Nevertheless, as discussed below, such laws can limit the sexual 
freedoms—and constitutionally protected substantive due process rights—
of older adults.  
A. Overview of Laws Prohibiting Elder Sexual Abuse 
In recent years, states have adopted a series of statutes that specifically 
prohibit certain behaviors considered to constitute sexual abuse of older 
adults. Such statutes tend to take one of two approaches, or a combination 
of both.  
The first approach is to prohibit certain suspect sexual activities. For 
example, under Florida law, a person may be held civilly liable for “sexual 
abuse” if he or she commits “acts of a sexual nature . . . in the presence of 
 
 
 167. A full discussion of the implications of the “third strand” is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but will be developed in the author’s future work. 
 168. See Ann W. Burgess & Steven L. Phillips, Sexual Abuse, Trauma and Dementia in the 
Elderly: A Retrospective Study of 284 Cases, 1 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 193 (2006). 
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a vulnerable adult without that person’s informed consent.”169 The 
definition of a “vulnerable adult” includes any adult “whose ability to 
perform the normal activities of daily living or to provide for his or her 
own care or protection is impaired due to . . . the infirmities of aging.”170 
The objection of the victim is not required to bring such a lawsuit against 
an alleged violator: the victim’s guardian or estate may do so 
independently.171 The effect of the statute is to permit civil liability to be 
imposed on anyone who engages in a wide range of activities—whether 
they be an actor performing a sexually explicit play, an erotic dancer 
performing in a show, or a long-standing sexual partner engaging in sexual 
foreplay—in front of a person of “advanced age” (because Florida allows 
“infirmities of aging” to be manifested simply by “advanced age” itself) 172 
without obtaining the person’s informed consent. Although an exception 
exists for “appropriate displays of affection,” no definition of what 
constitutes such a display is provided.173  
The second, more common statutory approach is to prohibit sexual 
activities, or categories of sexual activities, between certain classes of 
people: usually between anticipated victims and persons in a caregiving 
role.  
For example, Vermont makes it a crime for a person in a volunteer or 
paid capacity at a caregiving facility or program to engage in a sex act 
with a “vulnerable adult.”174 Unless the defendant was “hired, supervised, 
and directed” by the vulnerable adult, consent is no defense.175 Vermont 
 
 
 169. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.102(24) (West Supp. 2008) (Further stating that sexual abuse 
“includes, but is not limited to . . . fondling, exposure of a vulnerable adult’s sexual organs, or the use 
of a vulnerable adult to solicit for or engage in prostitution or sexual performance . . . [but] does not 
include any act intended for a valid medical purpose or any act that may reasonably be construed to be 
normal caregiving action or appropriate display of affection.”). 
 170. See id. § 415.102(26). 
 171. See id. § 415.1111 (allowing a successful plaintiff to recover both actual and punitive 
damages).  
 172. See id. § 825.101(5). 
 173. See id. § 415.102(34). 
 174.  
A person who volunteers for or is paid by a caregiving facility or program shall not engage in 
any sexual activity with a vulnerable adult. It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution 
under this subsection that the sexual activity was consensual between the vulnerable adult and 
a caregiver who was hired, supervised, and directed by the vulnerable adult. A person who 
violates this subsection shall be imprisoned for not more than two years or fined not more 
than $10,000.00, or both. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1379(a) (2008).  
 175. See id. (“It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
sexual activity was consensual between the vulnerable adult and a caregiver who was hired, 
supervised, and directed by the vulnerable adult.”). Although one could read the statute as not making 
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broadly defines the term “vulnerable adult” to include any adult who 
exhibits “infirmities of aging” that result in “some” impairment of his or 
her ability to “provide for his or her own care without assistance.”176 The 
relevant statute provides, as examples of such persons, those whose age-
related infirmities impair their abilities to provide their own food, shelter, 
clothing, health care, supervision, or financial management.177 Thus, if 
Sam volunteers at his local adult day care center, he is potentially a 
criminal if he subsequently makes love to his wife Diane, an octogenarian 
who due to a bad hip has trouble independently shopping for groceries.178 
Similarly, if Sam is a seventy-year-old volunteer who meets Diane while 
she is attending a program at the adult day care center, any subsequent 
sexual acts between the two are criminal. It does not matter that Diane has 
full mental capacity, that she initiated the sexual relationship, or that all 
acts are fully consensual. Her age-related disability nevertheless makes her 
a criminal liability.  
Similarly, Washington State bars consensual sex between a disabled 
person who is sixty years of age or older179 and a person who provides him 
or her with paid transportation. Specifically, a person who provides such 
transportation to someone other than his or her lawfully married spouse is 
guilty of the class A felony of rape in the second degree if the two engage 
in sexual intercourse.180 Similarly, a paid transportation provider who 
 
 
this the exclusive defense to the crime of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult, no other portion of the 
Vermont code appears to offer a consent-based defense to a defendant charged in this crime. 
 176. Vermont defines “vulnerable adult” as: 
any person 18 years of age or older who: (A) is a resident of a facility required to be licensed 
under chapter 71 of Title 33; (B) is a resident of a psychiatric hospital or a psychiatric unit of 
a hospital; (C) has been receiving personal care and services from an agency certified by the 
Vermont department of aging and independent living or from a person or organization that 
offers, provides, or arranges for personal care; or (D) regardless of residence or whether any 
type of service is received, is impaired due to brain damage, infirmities of aging, or a 
physical, mental, or developmental disability that results in some impairment of the 
individual’s ability to: (i) provide for his or her own care without assistance, including the 
provision of food, shelter, clothing, health care, supervision, or management of finances; or 
(ii) protect himself or herself from abuse, neglect, or exploitation. 
Id. 
 177. See id. § 1375(8). 
 178. Read literally, there is no requirement that the vulnerable adult be part of the facility or 
program in which the “caregiver” is involved. 
 179. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(16) (West Supp. 2008) (defining “[f]rail elder or 
vulnerable adult” as “a person sixty years of age or older who has the functional, mental, or physical 
inability to care for himself or herself. ‘Frail elder or vulnerable adult’ also includes a person found 
incapacitated . . . , a person over eighteen years of age who has a developmental disability . . . , a 
person admitted to a long-term care facility . . . , and a person receiving services from a home health, 
hospice, or home care agency . . . .”). Id. 
 180. See id. § 9A.44.050(1)(f), which states: 
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“knowingly causes” a disabled person age sixty or older who is not his or 
her spouse “to have sexual contact with him or her or another” is guilty of 
the class B felony of “indecent liberties,”181 regardless of whether that 
contact is consensual. Thus, should Desi provide Lucy, a disabled sixty-
two-year-old, with a ride in his taxi he may subsequently become a felon 
and rapist if they become lovers and also may become a felon if—after 
some conversation—he sets her up on a date with his brother-in-law, his 
best friend, or even his pastor. 
Oklahoma takes a different but related approach, barring virtually all 
sexual activities between a caretaker182 and a vulnerable adult, regardless 
of whether there is consent.183 Unlike the statutory schemes in Vermont or 
Washington, age is not explicitly linked to vulnerability, although the 
elderly population appears to have been the target of the prohibition.184 
Rather, the term “vulnerable adult” is defined as a person who, because of 
a disability, is “substantially impaired” in the ability to, among other 
things, provide for her own care, effectively manage her property and 
finances, or protect herself from abuse without assistance.185 Thus, if 
Martha has primary responsibility for taking personal or financial care of 
 
 
A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when, under circumstances not constituting 
rape in the first degree, the person engages in sexual intercourse with another person . . . 
[w]hen the victim is a frail elder or vulnerable adult and the perpetrator is a person who is not 
married to the victim and who: (i) Has a significant relationship with the victim; or (ii) Was 
providing transportation, within the course of his or her employment, to the victim at the time 
of the offense. 
See also id. § 9A.44.050(2) (stating that rape in the second degree is a class A felony). 
 181. See id. § 9A.44.100 (setting forth the elements for the crime of “indecent liberties”). 
 182. The statute criminalizing such abuse does not specifically define the term “caretaker.” 
However, other parts of the statute make reference to terms defined in the state’s adult protection 
statutes, and it seems most reasonable to conclude that the term “caretaker” would be interpreted as set 
forth in those statutes. There, the term caretaker is defined as a person who has: “a. the responsibility 
for the care of a vulnerable adult or the financial management of the resources of a vulnerable adult as 
a result of a family relationship, b. assumed the responsibility for the care of a vulnerable adult 
voluntarily, by contract, or as a result of the ties of friendship, or c. been appointed a guardian, limited 
guardian, or conservator.” See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-103 (West 2008). 
 183. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 843.1 (West 2008). 
 184. See Press Release, Senator Ron Justice, Okla. State Senate, Bill Strengthening Penalties 
Against Elder Abuse Advances to House (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.oksenate.gov/news/ 
press_releases/press_releases_2008/pr20080307a.html (describing efforts to increase the penalties for 
sexual abuse of vulnerable adults as aimed at protecting the elderly). 
 185. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-103(5) (Supp. 2005), which states: 
“Vulnerable adult” means an individual who is an incapacitated person or who, because of 
physical or mental disability, incapacity, or other disability, is substantially impaired in the 
ability to provide adequately for the care or custody of himself or herself, or is unable to 
manage his or her property and financial affairs effectively, or to meet essential requirements 
for mental or physical health or safety, or to protect himself or herself from abuse, verbal 
abuse, neglect, or exploitation without assistance from others. 
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her paraplegic husband George, she is a felon if they engage in sexual 
relations together regardless of George’s mental state, who initiates the 
behavior, or the purpose of the behavior.  
B. Existing Critiques of Elder Sexual Abuse Prohibitions 
There is growing interest in the sexual activity and rights of older 
adults.186 Yet, despite a climate in which sexual rights are the subject of 
much discussion, there has been a profound silence as to the value, 
effectiveness, desirability, or legal permissibility of laws designed to 
protect older adults from sexual mistreatment. Existing critiques of such 
laws are almost non-existent, and nowhere in the legal literature or the 
social science literature has the author found recognition that these laws 
may adversely impact older adults’ legal rights.  
This lack of critique is both troubling and telling. If we do not 
recognize these laws’ effects on individual liberties, such laws might 
appear to have no cost. The result will be a burdening of individual liberty 
without any appreciation of that burden, and thus without any 
consideration of less restrictive methods for achieving the underlying 
policy objectives. The next section of this Article attempts to rectify this 
problem by identifying the burdens such laws impose on the civil rights of 
older adults. 
C. A Rights-Based Critique of Elder Sexual Abuse Prohibitions 
State statutes barring consensual sexual acts raise serious substantive 
due process concerns. In Lawrence v. Texas,187 the United States Supreme 
Court recognized that consenting adults have a protected liberty interest in 
engaging in private sexual activity without intervention by the 
government.188 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy determined that 
no legitimate state interest justified a Texas statute that burdened the 
liberty interest by prohibiting certain homosexual sexual activity.189  
 
 
 186. The growing interest is likely apparent to anyone who regularly reads a major newspaper, 
and has been remarked on by many others. See, e.g., Karyn M. Skultety, Addressing Issues of Sexuality 
with Older Couples, 31 GENERATIONS 31, 31 (2007).  
 187. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 188. See id. (opinion of Justice Kennedy). 
 189. In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor chose to decide the case on equal protection grounds, 
and therefore did not need to determine whether or not the statute at issue violated substantive due 
process rights. See id. at 584–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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1. The Nature of the Undermined Right 
The right undermined by the previously described statutes seeking to 
address sexual abuse of older adults is the same right that was violated in 
Lawrence. Like the statute at issue in Lawrence, the previously described 
statutes seeking to prevent sexual abuse of older adults burden those 
adults’ right to engage in consensual sexual activity with other consenting 
adults. Older adults and disabled adults who have the capacity to consent 
to sexual activity have no less of a liberty interest in private, consensual 
relations than did the Lawrence defendants. To the contrary, adults of all 
ages and abilities can have the desire and capacity to engage in sexual 
activity.190 Despite stereotypes of older or disabled persons as de-
sexualized, sexual expression is an important part of the life and dignity of 
many such persons.191  
The fact that the class (disabled and older persons) targeted under 
sexual abuse laws is not held criminally responsible under such laws, 
whereas the class targeted in Lawrence (homosexuals) was held criminally 
responsible, is of no consequence. Both types of laws significantly 
undermine the targeted groups’ right to engage in consensual, adult sexual 
activity and can be expected to have a “chilling” effect on such activity. A 
person whose partner is subject to criminal enforcement if the two engage 
in sexual activity is no freer to engage in such activity than the person who 
would him or herself be held criminally liable.  
Critics might argue that the liberty interest described in Lawrence is 
distinguishable from that implicated by the elder protection statutes 
because the validity and voluntariness of consent was not an issue in 
Lawrence and is a concern in situations involving older or frail adults.192 A 
 
 
 190. See Stacy Tessler Lindau et al., A Study of Sexuality and Health Among Older Adults in the 
United States, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 762 (2007) (finding, in a national study of community-dwelling 
adults age 57–85, that lack of interest in sexual activity is not a primary reason for not engaging in 
sexual activity later in life).  
 191. See id. at 772 (finding, based on a national study of community-dwelling adults ages 57–85, 
that 53% of those 65 to 74 were sexually active, as were 26% of those age 75 to 85, and concluding 
that “the majority of older adults are engaged in spousal or other intimate relationships and regard 
sexuality as an important part of life. The prevalence of sexual activity declines with age, yet a 
substantial number of men and women engage in vaginal intercourse, oral sex, and masturbation even 
in the eighth and ninth decades of life.”). 
 192. Critics might also attempt to distinguish the liberty interest described in Lawrence by 
focusing on the majority’s use of the word “private” to describe the type of sexual activity at issue in 
Lawrence. It could be argued that the sexual activity targeted by elder abuse statutes should often be 
treated as something other than “private” because it involves persons who have an underlying duty of 
care and, in some cases, may be being paid for such care. This argument, however, can be quickly 
overcome because it has two fundamental flaws. The first is that an examination of the use of the word 
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moderate version of this argument would point to the fact that older and 
disabled individuals may, due to their infirmities and attendant 
dependency, be in a position in which they are less likely to be able to 
deny consent to sexual activity. A more aggressive version would be to 
argue that even where such individuals affirmatively decide to engage in a 
prohibited sexual behavior, their decisions cannot be presumed voluntary 
because their social environment unduly restricts their choices. Such 
radical critiques would tend to equate sexual activity and sexual abuse.193 
It is true that the majority opinion in Lawrence was unequivocally 
limited to consensual sex acts. The majority noted firmly, albeit in dicta, 
that the case did not involve “persons who might be injured or coerced or 
who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be 
refused.”194 Thus, to the extent that elder protection statutes prohibit 
nonconsensual sex—or even impose significant burdens for proving 
consent for certain categories of persons—they do not undermine a liberty 
interest that has been recognized by the Supreme Court. By contrast, 
statutes that bar consensual sexual activity—such as the Vermont, 
Washington, and Oklahoma statutes—parallel the statute at issue in 
Lawrence and thus do implicate a constitutionally recognized interest. 
Some of the persons targeted by statutes barring consensual sexual 
activity may be in a position due their physical, psychological, or social 
condition that makes it difficult to refuse consent. Thus, facial challenges 
to such statutes can be expected to fail as not every application of such 
laws would constitute a violation of a constitutionally protected interest.195 
However, other persons swept into the reach of these overly broad statutes 
 
 
“private” in Lawrence indicates that the majority used the term to refer to the location of the conduct—
i.e., the home—and not to the nature of the defendants’ relationship. Subsequent lower court 
distinctions have read it as such. See, e.g., Singson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 682, 685 (Va. Ct. 
App. 2005) (contrasting the “private” activity at issue with the defendant’s solicitation of oral sex in a 
public restroom). Second, and perhaps more importantly, the fact that two persons have legal duties to 
one another does not make the sphere in which their relations occur any less “private.” Traditionally, 
the marital relationship has been seen as the most private of relationships and the most deserving of 
protection from government interference. Yet the marital relationship is a legal creation which imposes 
significant duties of care and support on the couple involved. 
 193. The two have been equated in similar contexts. See Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. 
Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1662–63 (2004) (“To infer that sex was consensual from the mere fact 
that it occurred, as the Court’s Lawrence opinion does, tips the constitutional scales in favor of sex, 
which is to say, in favor of perpetrators of sexual violence.”).  
 194. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 195. Cf. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 140 (2008) (explaining that a litigant may generally 
not pursue a facial constitutional challenge if the law is constitutional as applied to that litigant 
because a facial challenge contends that the law, “by its own terms, always operates 
unconstitutionally”). 
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may not be impaired in their ability to refuse consent and thus might well 
prevail in an as-applied constitutional challenge.  
The fact that a person has a dependency—whether physical or social—
is not evidence of an impaired ability to consent to sexual activity. A 
person’s capacity to consent in many instances may not be at all impaired 
by his or her disability, and to presume otherwise is to relegate disabled 
individuals to second-class citizenship. Similarly, the existence of a social 
dependency is also an illegitimate basis for determining whether a person 
is capable of consent. It seems reasonable to posit that most long-term 
relationships in which sexual intimacy occurs involve a degree of 
interdependency. As feminist legal theorists have explained, dependency 
is not an abnormal state but the common condition of human existence.196 
The extent and nature of the dependency that disabled or frail persons 
experience may reflect their physical status, but the existence of 
dependence is not unique to such persons.197 Moreover, Lawrence suggests 
that consent is something that will, as a general matter, be presumed.198  
Similarly, relationships involving frail or disabled adults—who may be 
dependent on other people, including caregivers with whom they are 
engaged in sexual relations—should not be considered the type of 
relationships in which consent might not be sufficiently easy to refuse 
within the meaning of Lawrence.199 Although some relationships between 
 
 
 196. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004) (arguing that the 
traditional conception of individual autonomy is a myth, and that human inter-dependency is universal 
and inevitable).  
 197. See Ann Hubbard, The Myth of Independence and the Major Life Activity of Caring, 8 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 327, 349 (2004). Hubbard explains that: 
Dependency is part of the human condition, an aspect of our animality—not something to be 
stigmatized, scorned or pitied. Recognizing dependency and the attendant need for care as 
natural and inevitable, not exceptional or pathological, challenges the socially constructed 
dichotomy between the independent, self-sufficient non-disabled person and the dependent, 
needy disabled person. Getting beyond those stereotypes is one of the principal obstacles to 
social, political and legal recognition of the capabilities and contributions of people with 
disabilities. 
Id. 
 198. In Lawrence, consent was presumed, not proven, and the majority nowhere suggests that its 
facile willingness to make such a presumption was unique to the case in question. Cf. Spindelman, 
supra note 193, at 1655 (criticizing this presumption and arguing that Lawrence could be seen as 
writing a distinction between “unwelcome” and “involuntary” sex into the Constitution).  
 199. There are some situations in which, consistent with Lawrence, courts have allowed an adult 
to be held criminally liable for engaging in sexual activities with another adult without the state first 
proving a lack of consent. For example, one court held that Lawrence does not prohibit the imposition 
of criminal liability on an officer who engaged in sexual activity with an army private of considerably 
lesser rank. See Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 519 (2005) (“[T]he nature of the relationship 
[between an army private] and a lieutenant of significantly higher rank” was “such that consent might 
not easily be refused and thus it is outside of the liberty interest protected by Lawrence.”). Another 
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frail or disabled elders and caregivers may be sufficiently coercive or 
involve such dependency on the part of the elder that consent cannot be 
easily refused, many other such relationships may not. Rather, in many of 
the relationships that would be criminalized by such statutes, the frail or 
disabled adult may have significant power over the caregiver, either 
because of an employment relationship or because of the balance of power 
that characterizes their intimate relationship (and which may pre-date the 
onset of disability). In other cases, the parties may be mutually dependent 
on one another.  
Not only is the liberty interest recognized in Lawrence the same 
interest undermined by statutes that limit the sexual liberty of older adults 
in the name of preventing abuse, but the burdens imposed by the laws 
(while not identical) are in some cases analogous. In Lawrence, the 
plurality described the stigma created by criminalizing homosexual 
activities, categorizing the Texas statute at issue as “a way to demean 
[homosexuals’] existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime.”200 Criminalizing consensual sexual conduct by 
the aged or frail is also demeaning and stigma-creating. Already, older 
persons find themselves stereotyped as sexless.201 Indeed, sexual activity 
by older adults is apt to be perceived as abnormal or even pathological.202 
As Simone de Beauvoir noted, “If old people show the same desires, the 
same feelings, and the same requirements as the young, the world looks at 
them with disgust: in them love and jealousy seem revolting or absurd . . . 
[and] sexuality repulsive . . . .”203 Laws that criminalize sexual activity 
with older adults—laws that deem their sexual partners to be felons—
further entrench this stereotype of sexuality on the part of older people as 
perverse.  
Elder sexual protection statutes also create collateral consequences that 
are analogous to those that burdened the liberty interests of Texas 
homosexuals in Lawrence. Persons convicted under the Texas anti-
homosexual conduct statute faced collateral consequences, including 
 
 
held the same with regards to a corrections officer who engaged in sexual activities with multiple 
inmates in the correctional facility in which she worked. See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 
418, 425 (Pa. 2003) (finding Lawrence inapplicable where “[s]exual contact between correctional staff 
and inmates is obviously rife with the possibility of coercion, both subtle and overt, given the 
extensive power guards exercise over inmates”). 
 200. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 201. BARBARA SHERMAN, SEX, INTIMACY & AGED CARE 3–4 (1999). 
 202. Id.  
 203. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE COMING OF AGE 3 (1972); see also EGLIT, supra note 161, at 
173 n.14 (discussing de Beauvoir’s insight).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] OUTLIVING CIVIL RIGHTS 1099 
 
 
 
 
inclusion in criminal registries and negative consequences for future 
employment.204 Collateral consequences are also significant in elder abuse 
cases, although somewhat less direct. Persons convicted of sexual abuse of 
older adults are increasingly likely to be barred from working with or 
caring for the elderly.205 The “abused” adult may face unwanted protective 
action such as involuntary isolation from the “abuser” or involuntary 
removal from a shared accommodation with the “abuser.” In addition, as 
discussed earlier, persons investigated as victims of elder abuse are highly 
likely to be institutionalized as a result and are also at disproportionate risk 
of having their right to make personal choices eliminated through the 
imposition of a guardianship.206  
2. The Permissibility of the Burden 
Having shown how the liberty interest recognized in Lawrence is 
implicated in certain statutes aimed at protecting elders from sexual abuse, 
the issue is whether the burden such statutes impose on that interest is 
constitutionally permissible. Unlike the statute at issue in Lawrence, elder 
protection statutes advance a legitimate government interest: preventing 
sexual abuse. Thus, unlike the Texas statute, the elder protection statutes 
cannot be rejected on the grounds that they serve no legitimate state 
purpose. Instead, for such statutes to be found unconstitutional, their 
means must be found impermissible.  
Unfortunately, Lawrence provides little guidance as to how closely 
courts should scrutinize state legislation that burdens consensual adult 
sexual activity. The level of scrutiny used by the Lawrence majority—and 
thus the level of scrutiny to be used in cases where such rights are 
undermined—has been the subject of extensive debate. Some scholars 
have categorized it is as “rational basis” scrutiny; others, as a “more 
searching form of rational basis” or “rational basis on steroids.”207 
However, even if courts use the lowest level of scrutiny—that is, even if 
they simply require that means selected bear a “reasonable relation to a 
 
 
 204. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575–76. 
 205. See Connelly, supra note 134 (discussing the political push for greater use of background 
checks for caregivers). 
 206. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 207. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 1235, 1279 (2007) (describing the standard of review in Lawrence as a “more searching form of 
rational basis”); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (2004) 
(describing the standard of review in Lawrence as “rational basis on steroids”).  
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legitimate state interest”208—some statutes aimed at protecting elders from 
sexual mistreatment could nevertheless be found unconstitutional.  
Consider Washington’s statute barring consensual sex between a 
disabled person over the age of sixty and a person who provides him or 
her with transportation, but not barring such sex where the disabled person 
is a younger adult.209 What possible justification is there for the use of the 
age sixty to limit rights? One possible justification is that older persons are 
at greater risk for sexual mistreatment. However, the evidence clearly does 
not support such a conclusion. To the contrary, older adults are far less 
likely to be the victims of sexual assault or rape than younger adults. 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, persons age fifty and over 
account for less than three percent of rape and sexual assault victims, even 
though they comprise almost a third of the general population.210 Persons 
age sixty-five and over account for less than one percent of such crimes.211 
This does not mean that sexual abuse of older adults is not a problem,212 
that an individual’s old age provides protection from abuse, that sexual 
abuse of the elderly is not occurring at an unacceptably frequent rate, or 
even that the U.S. Department of Justice statistics do not underestimate its 
frequency. It does, however, preclude justifying restricting the sexual 
liberty of older adults based on a notion that they are at increased risk for 
sexual victimization. 
Another possible justification for the Washington statute is that older 
persons are less likely to be able to refuse consent to sexual activity. If 
reaching the age of sixty were a significant risk factor for being able to 
refuse consent, the statute’s age-based distinction, although crude, would 
not be arbitrary. Yet there is no basis to believe that reaching the age of 
sixty puts a person at any meaningfully increased risk of being unable to 
so consent. Granted, as persons become older, the likelihood that they will 
be afflicted by some degree of cognitive impairment increases, as does the 
likelihood that they will be limited in their ability to independently provide 
for their own personal care (i.e., to perform “activities of daily living” or 
 
 
 208. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997). 
 209. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050(1)(s) (West 2008). 
 210. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AGE PATTERNS OF VICTIMS OF 
SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIMES (1997), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/apvsvc.pdf. 
 211. See id. 
 212. Age is not a barrier to sexual mistreatment and there is increasing recognition that older 
adults can be—and all too frequently are—the victims of serious sexual crimes. See ANN W. BURGESS, 
ELDERLY VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE & THEIR OFFENDERS (2006), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/216550.pdf. Moreover, as is the case with younger victims, sexual abuse has 
serious consequences for elderly victims. 
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“ADLs”) or to independently manage basic household tasks (i.e., to 
perform “instrumental activities of daily living” or “IADLs”).213 At the age 
of sixty, however, the vast majority of individuals are cognitively intact 
and not limited in either ADLs or IADLs.214 In addition, even though the 
likelihood of cognitive disability increases with age, the majority of non-
institutionalized persons with such disabilities are not old.215 Moreover, to 
the extent that emotional difficulties impede the ability to refuse consent, 
older individuals are less likely to be disadvantaged, as the vast majority 
of non-institutionalized persons with emotional difficulties are young or 
middle-aged.216  
Thus, a strong argument can be made that criminalizing certain forms 
of sexual activity based on an individual reaching the age of sixty or sixty-
five is unreasonable and cannot withstand even the most lenient level of 
judicial scrutiny.217 By contrast, statutes that limit sexual liberty based on 
vulnerability, such as those in Oregon and Vermont, are more likely to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. “Vulnerability” does appear to be an 
independent risk factor for sexual abuse and might increase the likelihood 
that the individual feels dependent on the would-be abuser and thus unable 
to deny consent. If the level of scrutiny applied to statutes that undermine 
the liberty interest in adult, consensual activity is something more than 
traditional “rational basis” review,218 however, this second category of 
statute might plausibly be considered constitutionally suspect as well 
because there may not be a sufficiently strong relationship between such 
“vulnerability” and an inability to refuse consent.219  
 
 
 213. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, QUICKSTATS: ESTIMATED 
PERCENTAGE OF ADULTS WITH DAILY ACTIVITY LIMITATIONS, BY AGE GROUP AND TYPE OF 
LIMITATION—NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, UNITED STATES, 2006, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5640a7.htm. 
 214. Id. 
 215. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DISABILITY AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, 
2001–2005, at 16 (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/disability2001-2005.pdf 
(approximately 57% of those with cognitive disabilities are under the age of 65). 
 216. Id. (only 12.6% of non-institutionalized persons with emotional difficulties are 65 years of 
age or older; 87.4% are under the age of 65). 
 217. The higher the age used, perhaps the more likely such statutes are to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny as impairments—both physical and mental—become far more prevalent among the oldest of 
the old. 
 218. There is good reason for categorizing the standard of review as something more than 
traditional rational basis review. As Nan Hunter has written, “One cannot simply conclude that the 
Lawrence test is one of rational basis. The rational-basis test . . . as we have known it, will almost 
never lead to the invalidation of a state law.” See Hunter, supra note 207, at 1113. Hunter describes the 
plurality’s approach instead as “rational basis on steroids for analyzing a substantive due process 
claim.” Id. at 1129. 
 219. In addition to a substantive due process critique, elder mistreatment statutes might also be 
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In short, it appears that at least certain provisions in statutes that have 
been adopted to protect elders from sexual abuse are overly broad and 
therefore might not survive an as-applied constitutional challenge in a 
court of law.220 Moreover, even if they withstood challenge, they would 
nevertheless undermine a constitutional interest in consensual sexual 
activity and, by doing so, the “equal dignity of older adults,” 221 as well as 
such adults’ sexual self-determination and sexual sovereignty.222 To treat 
such laws as harmless thus requires a willingness to view the deprivation 
of liberty as something other than a harm. Assuming such laws are largely 
harmless also requires overlooking the reality that the availability of 
sexual partners can be very limited in later life. This is especially likely to 
be true among the categories of persons affected by the elder sexual 
mistreatment statutes, and thus such statutes may effectively deny older 
individuals the possibility of sexual relations.223  
D. Conclusion 
Statutes seeking to protect older adults can limit their right to engage in 
consensual sexual activity, despite the fact that older adults have a 
constitutionally based liberty interest in engaging in such activity. Such 
limits can amount to unconstitutional violations of elders’ rights, to the 
extent that they arbitrarily deny individuals the ability to engage in sexual 
 
 
susceptible to an equal protection critique along the lines of that suggested for mandatory elder abuse 
reporting statutes. See discussion supra notes 158–67 and accompanying text. 
 220. This conclusion, at first blush, seems to be exactly what critics of Lawrence warned about: 
that by protecting private, sexual conduct, one might make it more difficult to prohibit coercive or 
otherwise exploitative sexual relations. Yet the elder abuse context may point to the flaws in their 
argument.  
 221. See Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not 
Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004).  
 222. See Sonia K. Katyal, Sexuality and Sovereignty: The Global Limits and Possibilities of 
Lawrence, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1429, 1461 (2006). 
 223. In explaining why Lawrence does not require the invalidation of laws prohibiting incest, 
Larry Tribe explains that incest laws only leave a very small circle of people off limits to an 
individual, whereas the Texas statue ruled “half the adult population off limits as sexual or marital 
partners for a distinct and despised minority.” Tribe, supra note 221, at 1944. Thus, incest laws “cut no 
wide swath through the population to limit the options open to any particular oppressed minority.” Id. 
Like incest laws, elder protection laws limiting consensual sex between caregivers and adults rule out 
only a very small number of potential partners. However, compared to bans on incest, such laws are 
far more likely to effectively rule out the majority of persons—or even all persons—who are potential 
sexual partners for a vulnerable elder. If an elder’s only contacts are with people in a caretaking role 
(especially given how broadly such roles may be defined), prohibiting sexual relations with caretakers 
may leave no legal form of sexual activity open to the elder. Thus, the equal protection concerns that 
made the Texas statute so troubling—and arguably led the majority to implicitly use a heightened 
standard of review—exist in this context as well. 
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relations based solely on their chronological age. Moreover, such statutes 
might have a significant practical effect on the availability of sexual 
partners later in life, and might further entrench inaccurate and demeaning 
stereotypes about older adults’ sexual lives. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF OVERLOOKING OLDER ADULTS’ CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS 
The preceding Parts of this Article have shown how scholars and 
policymakers have overlooked the constitutional rights implications of 
elder protection statutes. The next Part explores the impact this failure has 
had on the development and design of elder protection systems and the 
older adults such systems are designed to serve. It then shows how 
recognizing the ways elder protection systems undermine civil rights could 
fundamentally shift the focus of efforts aimed at addressing elder 
mistreatment. 
A. The Value of a Rights Discourse 
Failing to recognize that an elder protection policy limits the autonomy 
or freedom of older adults corrupts even the most basic utilitarian 
assessment of the policy’s relative costs and benefits. For example, a cost-
benefit analysis of Vermont’s sexual mistreatment statute that did not 
consider the limitations that the statute places on older adults’ sexual 
freedoms as a “cost” would clearly be incomplete. It is not enough, 
however, simply to recognize that such a policy limits autonomy. To the 
extent that such limitations are restraints on a person’s legally protected 
rights, that too must be recognized.  
Recognizing a burden, but failing to label it as a burden on a “right,” 
has profound consequences. In a country founded on liberal ideals and 
whose political discourse is dominated by competing notions of liberalism, 
the impact of labeling something as a “right” is significant. “Rights” can 
function as trump cards in a way that mere “values” cannot. In the view of 
leading liberal theorist Ronald Dworkin, for example, if something is a 
“right” it means that “it is worth paying the incremental cost in social 
policy or efficiency” necessary to prevent an invasion of that right.224 
Thus, if something is a “right” it is inappropriate simply to balance it 
against competing interests. Such a balancing approach would be 
anathema to the very concept of a “right.” Instead, for the government to 
 
 
 224. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 199 (1977). 
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invade a right, Dworkin would require the government to show either that 
a competing right is at stake or that the cost to society of not invading the 
right is of a “degree great enough to justify whatever assault on dignity or 
equality might be involved.”225  
Popular acceptance of this liberal conception of the role of government 
vis-à-vis its citizens means that whether something is labeled as a “right” 
can have significant policy consequences. 226 Where a right is at risk, the 
decision to adopt a policy threatening that right will generally place 
special weight on the harm to the right. The harm to the right cannot be 
treated as the equivalent of harms to interests that do not rise to the level 
of a “right.”  
Labeling a restriction as imposing a burden on a “right” not only 
affects policy choices, it might also affect individual and community 
behavior and how individual actors and communities structure 
relationships. As Martha Minow has explained, “claims of rights have a 
special resonance in our culture.”227 Consistent with this special 
resonance:  
[r]ights . . . can give rise to “rights consciousness” so that 
individuals and groups may imagine and act in light of rights that 
have not been formally recognized or enforced. Rights, in this 
sense, are neither limited to nor co-extensive with precisely those 
rules formally announced and enforced by public authorities. 
Instead, rights represent articulations—public or private, formal or 
informal—of claims that people use to persuade others (and 
themselves) about how they should be treated and about what they 
should be granted.228 
In Minow’s words, “[r]ights in this sense are not ‘trumps,’ but the 
language we use to try to persuade others to let us win this round.”229 
Labeling something as a constitutionally protected right further 
enhances its perceived value and inviolability. As Larry Kramer has 
written, “the ability to tie an argument to the Constitution is critical in 
constitutional politics, and the stronger or more persuasive the connection, 
 
 
 225. Id. at 200. 
 226. This is recognized even by those who disapprove of such effects. See MARY ANN GLENDON, 
RIGHTS TALK (1991) (describing and criticizing the significant power that the broadly accepted 
language of rights has on American policy choices). 
 227. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1877 
(1987). 
 228. Id. at 1867.  
 229. Id. at 1876. 
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the greater one’s claim to legitimacy in public debate.”230 Accordingly, 
Kramer notes that social movements seek to prevail by appealing to the 
Constitution and tying that appeal to traditional understandings about the 
meaning of the Constitution.231 Moreover, there is political value in 
cloaking arguments in constitutional language even where a constitutional 
challenge would be unsuccessful.232 Constitutional rights arguments can 
gain traction and help generate political support for a social cause even if 
those arguments would not prevail in a court of law.233 
The political value of the rights label persists despite the fact that, in 
the past several decades, “rights-talk” has come under attack from both 
right and left wing intellectuals.234 In part, the persistence of the value of 
rights discourse should be attributed to the fact that the power of this 
discourse extends far beyond elite institutions. The language of rights is 
compelling to the American public even if it is not in vogue among legal 
scholars, just as appeals to constitutional rights can be compelling to the 
public even when they would not sway the courts. 
 
 
 230. Larry Kramer, Generating Constitutional Meaning, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1444–45 (2006). 
Accord GLENDON, supra note 226, at 101–02 (discussing the important role that legal language plays 
in shaping Americans’ views, and arguing that Americans regard legal norms—especially 
constitutional law norms—as “expressions of minimal common values”). 
 231. Kramer, supra note 230, at 1445. 
 232. Cf. id. at 1445. (“[T]o say that a social movement must appeal by arguments that are 
recognizably legal in form is not to say that these arguments will satisfy a court, or even a lawyer or 
law professor. . . . Popular understandings of what constitutes a proper or persuasive legal argument 
may diverge from those of the profession without ceasing to be legal in the relevant sense.”); see also 
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, An Analysis of the Rights-Based Justification for Federal Intervention in 
Environmental Regulation, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y FORUM 185, 191–98 (2003) (discussing how 
arguments that there is a constitutional right to a clean environment continue to have persuasive value 
in the policy world despite their rejection by the courts). 
 233. See Herman Schwartz, The Wisdom and Enforceability of Welfare Rights as Constitutional 
Rights, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2, 3 (2001). Schwartz explains that: 
[T]he presence of rights in a constitution [does not] require[] that they be judicially 
enforceable for them to be meaningful. There is also political enforceability. An obligation 
that is constitutionally mandated will have more persuasive force in debates over budget and 
other priorities than something that is completely discretionary with the legislature. 
Proponents of universal health care and those concerned about the poor and needy might have 
fared better in the health care debates if health care and welfare were considered matters of 
constitutional right. 
Id. 
 234. Martha Minow summarized this two-sided attack nicely in 1987, when she wrote:  
Rights are under attack. Some conservatives criticize the expansion of rights for lacking a 
legitimate basis, for contributing to adversariness and social conflict, or for undermining 
respect for law. Some left-leaning scholars criticize rights because they are incoherent and 
indeterminate, or because they fail to promote community and responsibility. Whatever the 
reason, rights criticism abounds. 
Minow, supra note 227, at 1860. 
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What does this mean for elder protection policy? First, it means that it 
matters whether we label the burdens that elder protection systems pose on 
older adults as burdening those adults’ “rights” or simply burdening their 
“autonomy” or “self-determination.” Second, it means that it matters 
whether we label the burdens that such systems pose as burdening 
unspecified “rights” or whether we identify them as burdening “legal 
rights” or “constitutional rights.” Thus, recognizing the burden that elder 
protection systems impose on constitutionally protected rights has, at the 
very least, significant rhetorical and persuasive value.  
By contrast, failing to recognize or acknowledge such burdens allows 
for the adoption of statutes that conflict with widely held beliefs about the 
importance of individual rights. The design of many of the mandatory 
elder abuse reporting laws illustrates this well. An environment in which 
constitutional rights implications were overlooked facilitated the adoption 
of mandatory reporting statutes that significantly undermine elders’ 
privacy interests. Because the impact that such laws have on autonomy has 
been described only in ethical and moral terms, and not identified as a 
constitutional rights concern, it has been easy to dismiss this impact by 
treating it merely as one of many factors to be considered in determining 
the relative wisdom of such statutes. Consistent with this approach, for 
example, one scholar critiquing laws requiring attorneys to report financial 
abuse of the elderly concluded that such laws are appropriate and desirable 
as long as they result in “some” reports of “suspected” abuse being made 
that otherwise would not be made.235  
Given the extent to which labeling something as burdening a right 
carries moral and rhetorical value in modern American society, it seems 
reasonable to posit that were such burdens made obvious, policymakers 
would be far less willing to create the type of heavily paternalistic elder 
protection system that is currently common.236 This would not only mean 
significant changes in the mandatory reporting and sexual mistreatment 
statutes discussed earlier in this Article, but also changes to other laws 
designed to protect elders. The two case studies are merely examples of 
 
 
 235. Carolyn L. Dessin, Should Attorneys Have a Duty to Report Financial Abuse of the Elderly?, 
38 AKRON L. REV. 707, 722–23 (2005) (concluding that there is “no reason to do away with 
[mandatory reporting of suspected abuse by attorneys] if some reports of suspected abuse are made 
that would otherwise not be made”). 
 236. The history and development of the disability rights movement provides a good example of 
how viewing laws designed to help disadvantaged populations through a civil rights lens can result in 
dramatically different policies than viewing them through a social welfare lens. See generally Samuel 
R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing the history and impact 
of the anti-discrimination strategy adopted by disability rights advocates).  
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types of elder protection statutes that undermine the constitutional rights 
of the elderly. Another example would be statutes that allow services to be 
involuntarily imposed on victims of elder mistreatment.237 
A move toward less paternalistic elder protection systems would be 
beneficial to older adults. Burdening individuals’ constitutional rights has 
the potential to impact significantly their quality of life. For example, the 
right to informational privacy that is undermined by mandatory reporting 
statutes serves multiple purposes: it enables individuals to avoid unwanted 
embarrassment, allows individuals to modulate their intimacy and 
relationships with others through selective self-disclosure, and helps 
individuals avert misuse of their personal information.238 Moreover, 
denying such rights to older adults not only denies them the benefits of 
those rights, it also undermines their basic human dignity. It indicates that 
society views them as something less than full members of the 
community. This is both morally unacceptable and functionally 
counterproductive if the aim is to prevent or treat elder abuse. 
Undermining human dignity is inconsistent with victim empowerment, an 
important strategy for working with mistreated elders; it is also 
inconsistent with combating ageism, which is often cited as a “cause” of 
elder mistreatment.239  
B. An Alternative, Rights-Conscious Framework  
Identifying the burdens that elder protection systems impose on older 
adults’ constitutional rights thus has the potential to change the nature and 
tone of the debate over how to address the problem of elder mistreatment. 
This, in turn, paves the way for new approaches to addressing elder 
mistreatment—approaches that seek to protect older adults while 
respecting their constitutional interests. 
 
 
 237. Pennsylvania, for example, allows the provision of protective services where “the person to 
be protected is at imminent risk of death or serious physical harm” and the person is at least sixty years 
of age. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10225.307(a), 10225.103 (West 2007). Pennsylvania does not 
appear to have codified any other procedures that would cover emergency provision of services for 
adults under the age of sixty. This may be because, unlike most other states, APS in Pennsylvania only 
services individuals age sixty and over. 
 238. See Kang, supra note 57, at 1212–17 (explaining the values that informational privacy 
protects in the modern era); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (exploring the 
values that privacy protects, and explaining why the ability to control the dissemination of information 
about the self is an essential component of privacy). 
 239. Cf. Faulkner, supra note 48, at 90 (“[M]andatory reporting may, in fact, increase the potential 
for abuse by further infantilizing the elder adult’s position in society.”). 
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Once one adopts a rights-aware approach to elder mistreatment 
policymaking, the child abuse framework, upon which elder abuse 
legislation for so long has been modeled,240 seems an inappropriate frame 
of reference. Children have significantly fewer legal rights than adults, and 
the government is understood by the courts to be generally freer to 
regulate children’s rights than it is adults’ rights.241 Thus, looking at elder 
mistreatment policy through a constitutional rights lens suggests that 
heavily paternalistic approaches that might seem unobjectionable in the 
child abuse context can nevertheless be highly problematic when applied 
to persons who have attained adulthood, as have all victims of elder abuse. 
Unfortunately, the common use of the child abuse model, combined with a 
dose of ageism242—a key component of which is the tendency to 
infantilize the elderly by attributing child-like characteristics to them243—
has created a current environment in which the potential unsuitability and 
overbreadth of such policies can easily be overlooked. Labeling the 
burdens such laws impose on the constitutional rights of older adults, by 
comparison, helps create an environment in which this unsuitability and 
overbreadth can finally be seen and the need for an alternative model can 
finally become apparent. 
A rights-aware approach to elder mistreatment policy will thus require 
policymakers to seek new frames of reference. Perhaps the most relevant 
and useful alternative is the domestic violence framework.244 Although it 
 
 
 240. While the model continues to exert powerful influence, it has been a source of dissatisfaction 
for more than two decades. See id.; Crystal, supra note 52, at 334–35.  
 241. There is a wealth of Supreme Court precedent on this point. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 
497 U.S. 417, 482 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The law does not give to children many rights 
given to adults, and provides, in general, that children can exercise the rights they do have only 
through and with parental consent.”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1978) (opinion of Justice 
Powell) (“We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of 
children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to 
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child 
rearing.”). 
 242. The term “ageism” was first coined in 1969. See Robert Butler, Ageism: Another form of 
Bigotry, 9 GERONTOLOGIST 243 (1969) (originating the term). It is generally used to refer to 
stereotyping and discriminating against a particular age group. Cf. EDMAN B. PALMORE, AGEISM: 
NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE 4 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing competing definitions of ageism).  
 243. See Arnold Arluke & Jack Levin, Another Stereotype: Old Age as a Second Childhood, 
AGING, Aug.–Sept. 1984, at 7 (showing the pervasiveness of the “second childhood” stereotype by 
describing how older adults are treated as and depicted as being like children). See also EGLIT, supra 
note 161, at 11–12 (discussing imagery depicting older adults as children). The author was remiss in 
using the phrase “Second Childhood” to title an earlier article without providing an explicit critique of 
the stereotype. 
 244. The current tendency to ignore the domestic violence system as a model for elder protection 
systems is ironic given the women’s rights movement and its examination and public discussion of 
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was long overlooked by elder protection advocates,245 the domestic 
violence framework is increasingly being recognized as informative for 
two primary reasons.246 First, many instances of elder mistreatment 
involve the same type of intimate partner abuse that is seen among 
younger adults in domestic violence situations.247 Indeed, many instances 
of elder mistreatment could also be appropriately characterized as 
instances of domestic violence. Second, research suggests that the risk 
factors for elder abuse, even in situations where the perpetrator is not an 
intimate partner, are quite similar to those for domestic violence. 
Caregiver stress was for a long time cited as a primary cause of elder 
abuse, 248 and this was used to justify treating elder abuse as something 
 
 
oppressive intra-family relations has been credited with creating a climate in which elder mistreatment 
could be made visible. See WOLF & PILLEMER, HELPING, supra note 50, at 7.  
 245. Connections between domestic violence and elder abuse were first made in the late 1980s. 
See BRANDL ET AL., supra note 13. Since that time, the idea of looking to domestic violence has been 
suggested numerous times, although the civil rights implications of such a shift have not previously 
been fully fleshed out.  
 246. Most commonly, the domestic violence framework is described as informative for 
understanding and addressing intimate partner violence later in life. See, e.g., Deb Spangler & Bonnie 
Brandl, Abuse in Later Life: Power and Control Dynamics and a Victim-Centered Response, 12 J. AM. 
PSYCH. NURSES ASSOC. 322 (2007) (explaining how strategies used to assist younger domestic 
violence victims could also assist elderly victims of domestic violence); David A. Wolfe, Elder Abuse 
Intervention: Lessons from Child Abuse & Domestic Violence Initiatives, in ELDER MISTREATMENT, 
supra note 1, at 501 (looking to domestic violence interventions to inform elder abuse policy); Bonnie 
Brandl, Power and Control: Understanding Domestic Violence Later in Life, 24 GENERATIONS 39 
(2002) (arguing in favor of using the power and control model developed in the domestic violence 
arena to address domestic violence later in life). Recently, however, one commenter suggested that the 
domestic violence model should be used to address all forms of elder mistreatment. See Joseph W. 
Barber, Note, The Kids Aren’t All Right: The Failure of Child Abuse Statutes as a Model for Elder 
Abuse Statutes, 16 ELDER L.J. 107 (2008) (arguing that “[t]o effectively confront the problem of elder 
abuse, states should . . . approach elder abuse and mistreatment in a manner similar to their approaches 
to domestic violence” and sanguinely suggesting that if this is done “elder abuse may eventually be a 
thing of the past”). 
 247. See, e.g., Macolini, supra note 48, at 352 (“Elder abuse shares more characteristics in 
common with domestic violence than with child abuse.”); Sarah B. Harris, For Better or Worse: 
Spouse Abuse Grown Old, 8 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 1 (1996) (in a study examining domestic 
violence later in life, concluding that domestic violence later in life looks much like domestic abuse 
among younger adults and thus that “elder abuse” is not necessarily an age-related phenomenon). But 
see Patricia A. Bomba, Use of a Single Page Assessment and Management Tool: A Practical 
Clinician’s Approach to Identifying Elder Mistreatment, in ELDER ABUSE & MISTREATMENT: POLICY, 
PRACTICE & RESEARCH, supra note 20, at 105 (arguing that elder abuse should be framed as a 
“geriatric syndrome”). 
 248. See Linda R. Phillips, Theoretical Explanation of Elder Abuse: Competing Hypotheses & 
Unresolved Issues, in ELDER ABUSE: CONFLICT IN THE FAMILY, supra note 52, at 198 (explaining that 
the “situational model” was the first model to be developed for explaining elder abuse and that the 
“basic premise of the situational model is that as the stress associated with certain situational and/or 
structural factors increases for the abuser, the likelihood increases of abusive acts directed at a 
vulnerable individual who is seen as being associated with the stress”).  
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different than domestic violence.249 More recent research indicates, 
however, that caregiver stress is a poor explanation for mistreatment and is 
not a factor in the majority of instances.250 
Using the domestic violence framework as a point of reference would 
facilitate policy choices that are significantly more sensitive to the rights 
of older adults. Law reform efforts in the domestic violence arena have 
been shaped by the power and control model for explaining domestic 
violence.251 This model, currently the dominant causal explanation for 
domestic violence,252 posits that such violence results from a perpetrator’s 
desire to maintain power and control over a victim. Adherents of the 
model therefore advocate victim empowerment as a strategy for breaking 
harmful patterns in which the perpetrator uses abuse as a tool for exerting 
power and control over the victim.253 Consistent with this victim 
empowerment focus, victim choices are valued—not because those 
choices are necessarily wise but simply because they are the victim’s own. 
As such, use of the power and control model tends to limit the adoption of 
policies that restrict victim self-determination to situations in which the 
state has a very strong interest in doing so.  
The Wisconsin mandatory elder abuse reporting scheme, arguably the 
nation’s least constitutionally problematic, shows how this type of victim 
empowerment focus can positively affect the design of elder protection 
 
 
 249. Pillemer and Wolf’s important contribution to the early elder abuse literature, Elder Abuse: 
Conflict in the Family, provides a good example of how a caregiver stress explanation for elder abuse 
shaped policy choices. In most of Part III of the edited volume, the chapter authors embrace the 
“situational model” described in the previous footnote. Consistent with this approach, these authors 
advocate for addressing elder mistreatment by supporting caregivers. See ELDER ABUSE: CONFLICT IN 
THE FAMILY, supra note 52; see also BRANDL ET AL., supra note 13 (describing how the caregiver 
stress explanation has led to inappropriate responses to elder mistreatment). 
 250. See BRANDL ET AL., supra note 13, at 38–39. 
 251. See, e.g., Sally F. Golfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can 
Law Help End Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487 (2008) (using the 
power and control explanation for domestic violence to build an argument for reforming civil 
protection order laws in order to give victims greater say in shaping such orders). 
 252. See Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern & Intent: An Alternative 
Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552 (2007) (“[S]ocial scientists almost universally 
describe domestic violence as an ongoing pattern of conduct motivated by the batterer’s desire for 
power and control over the victim.”). The power and control model is not, of course, the only 
theoretical explanation for domestic violence. See ALISON CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THEORY-DRIVEN 
EXPLANATIONS OF MALE VIOLENCE AGAINST FEMALE PARTNERS: LITERATURE UPDATE AND 
RELATED IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT AND EVALUATION (1998) (discussing competing theories of 
domestic violence, including the power and control model). 
 253. By contrast, like child protection systems, approaches to addressing elder mistreatment tend 
to focus on protecting, not empowering, the victim of that mistreatment. Consistent with this 
fundamental divide, mandatory reporting—a policy that prioritizes protection of victims over victim 
self-determination—is now the backbone of states’ responses to elder abuse, whereas it is virtually 
non-existent in the domestic violence context unless the victim meets vulnerability criteria.  
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policies. Wisconsin’s mandatory reporting requirements, adopted in 2006, 
were designed by experts with extensive knowledge of domestic violence 
issues who recognized that a significant portion of elder abuse is also 
domestic violence.254 Consistent with this background, they embraced a 
power and control model for explaining many instances of elder abuse and 
a corresponding victim empowerment model for responding to it.255 The 
result was a very limited mandatory reporting scheme. Whereas most 
reporting schemes require reporting as long as the victim fits into a 
statutorily defined category of person and the reporter has a reasonable 
suspicion of mistreatment, Wisconsin limits reporting requirements to 
those situations that meet two additional conditions: (1) the alleged victim 
is at imminent risk of a serious harm, and (2) the alleged victim cannot 
“make an informed judgment about whether to report the risk.”256 An 
exception is only made where other victims are at risk.257 Thus, Wisconsin 
requires an invasion of the alleged victim’s privacy interest only in 
situations where the state has a very strong interest.  
Although looking to the domestic violence framework for legislative 
guidance can thus be expected to result in an approach to elder protection 
 
 
 254. Telephone interview with Jane Raymond, Advocacy & Protection Sys. Developer, Wis. 
Dep’t of Health & Family Servs. (Aug. 11 2008); Telephone interview with Betsy Abramson (Aug. 13, 
2008) (Wisconsin attorney involved in drafting the 2006 reforms). 
 255. Wisconsin is explicit in incorporating domestic violence concepts and victim empowerment 
strategies into its elder protection system. A summary of the state’s approach to mandatory reporting 
made available by the state specifically justifies that approach using the following explanation: “While 
originally researchers believed that the majority of elder abuse was caused by ‘caregiver stress,’ more 
recent studies conclude that most elder abuse is a result of the same ‘power and control’ factors as is 
other domestic violence.” BETSY ABRAMSON, WISCONSIN’S ELDER ABUSE & ADULT AT RISK 
REPORTING LAW (2006), available at http://www.cwag.org/uploads/Guardianship%20Support 
%20Center/Legis%20update%20Adult%20at%20Risk%20Laws%20BETSY%2010-06.pdf. Similarly, 
Wisconsin’s Department of Health and Family Services offered the following guidance to facilities 
that work with older adults:  
The rationale for an entity to potentially not report an incident of domestic violence in later 
life to an external agency is based on the need for victim safety (trusting the victim to know 
what is best for him/her) and the principles of self-determination and empowerment. When an 
incident of domestic violence in later life involves a competent victim and the event does not 
constitute a crime . . . , then the facility may defer to the wishes of how the victim would want 
to proceed. . . . In these circumstances an empowerment model of offering information, 
options and assistance is much more likely to be successful and not put the victim at greater 
risk. Find out what the victim wants to have happen and support those decisions as best you 
can. Victims of abuse can benefit simply from being heard, believed and supported. Identify 
ways that the victim can increase safety when the abuser visits. 
DIVISION OF DISABILITY AND ELDER SERVICES, WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVS., DDES 
INFO MEMO 2004-03 (June 22, 2004), available at http://dhs.wisconsin.gov/dsl_info/InfoMemos/ 
DDES/CY_2004/InfoMemo2004-03.htm (internal formatting omitted). 
 256. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.90(4) (West Supp. 2008). 
 257. See id.  
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that is more sensitive to constitutional rights concerns, it is only a partial 
solution. There are times when interventions designed to address domestic 
violence among younger adults may be ill-suited to domestic violence 
later in life. Domestic violence interventions, for example, are generally 
designed for victims who have the requisite mental capacity to understand 
the nature and consequences of their mistreatment and to seek help. Many 
victims of elder mistreatment, however, have significantly diminished 
mental capacity.258 Effective systems for addressing their abuse or neglect 
will have to take this reality into account. If they do not, they will be 
unable to effectively address elder mistreatment.  
Designing legislative or regulatory responses to elder mistreatment that 
sufficiently respect the rights of older adults therefore requires more than 
simply borrowing an existing framework from the domestic violence 
arena. It requires policymakers to actively analyze the rights implications 
of potential elder mistreatment interventions, and to be willing to reject 
those interventions that impose unreasonable burdens on older adults’ 
constitutional interests.  
This goal could be operationalized through a relatively simple two-step 
method for evaluating whether a proposed intervention unreasonably 
burdens constitutional interests. The first step is to identify and 
characterize any rights impacted by a proposed statute or regulation. If a 
right is implicated, the proposal should be rejected unless it satisfies 
Dworkin’s three-step test for determining whether a right may be 
burdened.259 Specifically, it should be rejected unless either (1) the values 
protected by the right are not at stake or are only at stake in some 
“attenuated” form, (2) another individual has a competing right of equal or 
greater importance that would otherwise be abridged, or (3) not abridging 
the right would result in a cost to society of a degree far beyond the cost to 
the right at issue. Although defining what constitutes a “right” inevitably 
creates grounds for dispute,260 for the purposes of evaluating potential 
elder mistreatment interventions the list should, at a minimum, include 
individual interests protected by the federal Constitution. Constitutionally 
protected rights are, especially given the important moral weight the 
Constitution carries in today’s society, a good proxy for those rights 
society sees as most fundamental. 
 
 
 258. See BRANDL ET AL., supra note 13, at 20 (noting that dementia is an independent risk factor 
for elder mistreatment). 
 259. See DWORKIN, supra note 224, at 200. 
 260. Indeed, this is a primary criticism of Dworkin’s theory of rights, as he has recognized. See id. 
at 365–67.  
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Thus, step one requires rejection of any intervention that undermines a 
constitutionally protected individual right without a strong government 
justification for doing so. This would result in the rejection of some 
statutes that the courts would uphold against constitutional challenge. It is, 
however, preferable to err by over-protecting constitutional rights than by 
under-protecting them.261 This is especially true in the context of elder 
mistreatment interventions because the underlying aim of such 
interventions is to protect rights of older adults—that is, to protect older 
adults from those who would deny them their rights, whether through 
abuse, neglect, or exploitation.  
Should the proposed policy or law survive step one, step two entails 
identifying the population whose rights may be limited under the proposal. 
If it would be politically or morally acceptable to limit the rights of all 
persons in the way that the proposal would limit the rights of the targeted 
group, the proposal should be considered to lack any significant civil 
rights concern and may be adopted.262 However, if it would not be 
acceptable to impose such burdens on all people, then the policymaker 
must determine whether there is something sufficiently different about the 
targeted group to make it legitimate for the state to selectively deny that 
group rights that the state would not deny to others. If there is not, the 
proposal should be rejected despite its potential benefits, and alternative 
mechanisms for achieving the underlying policy goal should be pursued 
instead. 
Step two is necessary because arguably the most fundamental right a 
person has is the right to be treated as worthy of concern and respect equal 
to that of other similarly situated persons.263 Thus, policies that selectively 
limit the rights of certain groups should be subjected to particularly close 
scrutiny.264 Such close scrutiny is unlikely to be considered 
constitutionally mandated in the elder mistreatment context because the 
courts have consistently refused to treat old age as a suspect classification 
for equal protection purposes.265 Nevertheless, close scrutiny akin to that 
 
 
 261. This is, of course, consistent with a Dworkinian approach to rights. See id. at 199. 
 262. This is not to suggest that the fact that a proposal poses no significant civil rights concerns 
makes it sensible or effective policy. 
 263. See DWORKIN, supra note 224, at 273 (arguing that this is the most fundamental of rights); 
see also RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 1 (2000) (declaring “equal concern” to be “the 
sovereign virtue of political community—without it government is only tyranny”). 
 264. Some might argue that step two is redundant if one considers the right to equal treatment in 
step one. Although some redundancies might result from the two-step process, given the importance of 
equal treatment, a separate line of analysis focusing attention on this issue is nevertheless worthwhile. 
 265. As discussed supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text, there may be reason to revisit this 
refusal.  
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which courts employ when scrutinizing constitutionally suspect 
classifications is desirable in this context because there is particular risk 
that policies that selectively target older adults for rights limitations will 
do so in an unreasonable manner. If older adults are seen as no longer 
engaged in the community or as no longer experiencing a valuable 
existence—as studies of ageist attitudes have shown to be the 
perception—limiting their liberties might be seen as largely harmless and 
inconsequential.266 Accordingly, special vigilance is appropriate where 
older adults are targeted for “assistance” that has not, or would not, be 
offered to younger adults.  
In short, taking the rights of older adults seriously requires stepping 
away from the child abuse model. The domestic violence framework 
provides a useful alternative framework for those seeking a more victim-
centered, civil rights-friendly approach. However, systems designed to 
address domestic violence should not simply be copied by those seeking to 
address elder mistreatment. Although these systems can inform elder 
abuse interventions, a civil rights-focused approach to addressing elder 
mistreatment requires potential interventions to be evaluated in light of the 
extent to which they burden specific civil rights and in light of the extent 
to which they treat individuals with equal dignity and concern. Using the 
proposed two-step approach for doing this would greatly improve the 
likelihood that the civil rights implications of elder mistreatment 
interventions are appreciated and that the right Dworkin identifies as the 
most fundamental—that to equal concern and respect—is given special 
consideration.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although elder protection statutes have rapidly proliferated throughout 
the nation for nearly three decades, and countless elders have been 
subjected to their provisions, this is the first article to seriously challenge 
their legal permissibility. This Article has demonstrated that elder 
protection systems as currently designed can impose significant costs on 
the civil rights of older adults. For example, in many states, older adults 
face the prospect of not being able to engage in certain confidential 
communications or to freely choose with whom to be intimate merely as a 
 
 
 266. For example, if older adults are seen as no longer being sexual beings, limiting their sexual 
freedom is unlikely to be perceived as troubling. Rather, limiting sexual freedom may merely be seen 
as a way to protect such individuals from something they do not—and perhaps should not—desire in 
the first place.  
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result of their chronological age or age-associated disabilities. Imposing 
such limitations on older adults in the name of protecting them is not only 
counterproductive, morally suspect, and ethically questionable, but also 
raises serious legal concerns. In many cases, such limitations burden 
legally-protected rights, and a subset of those limitations are so 
unreasonable that the courts should find them to be unconstitutional. 
Recognizing and describing the costs that current elder protection 
systems impose on older adults’ constitutional rights has the potential to 
change the tone and nature of the debate over how to prevent and respond 
to elder mistreatment. For too long, elder protection legislation has 
infantilized older adults, unjustifiably depriving them of important civil 
rights in the name of protecting them and, in the process, undermining 
their basic human dignity. The language of “rights” and especially of 
“constitutional rights” has very significant rhetorical power. It is time to 
use this power to generate the momentum needed to reform elder 
protection systems.  
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